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Note 
Just Wars with Unjust Allies: Use of Force and 
Human Rights Considerations on the Russian 
Intervention in Syria 
Brendan Delany 
Main Syrian 
Loyalist 
Factions 
General 
Religious/ 
Ethnic 
Composition 
Armed 
Forces 
Allies Enemies 
The Syrian 
Arab Republic 
(“SAR”) (a.k.a. 
the Assad 
regime) 
Arab Shia 
Muslims, 
Druze, 
Christians, 
other religious 
minority 
groups, pro-
regime Sunni 
Arab 
Muslims. 
The Military 
of Syria, 
including the 
Syrian Arab 
Army (“SAA”) 
and the 
irregular 
National 
Defense 
Forces 
(“NDF”). 
Russia, Iran, 
all loyalist 
factions, other 
Iranian 
backed 
militias. 
(Note: All 
loyalist 
factions have 
a truce with 
Syrian 
Kurdistan.) 
ISIL, all 
opposition 
factions. 
Hezbollah Shia Arab 
Muslims 
Irregular 
armed groups 
Russia, Iran, 
and all 
loyalist 
factions. 
ISIL, all 
opposition 
factions. 
 
  Brendan Delany is a third year law student graduating in May 2017, 
focusing his legal studies primarily on international and criminal law. He 
obtained his Bachelor of Arts Degree in History from Rutgers University, New 
Brunswick, and has had a lifelong interest in the history of the Middle East and 
Central Asia. In September 2016, this Note won the National Institute of 
Military Justice Admiral John S. Jenkins Prize for Excellence in Military. 
Brendan was also a member of the University of Minnesota team participating 
in the 4th Clara Barton International Humanitarian Law Competition in March 
2017, where they won first prize as a team. 
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Main Syrian 
Loyalist 
Factions 
General 
Religious/ 
Ethnic 
Composition 
Armed 
Forces 
Allies Enemies 
Liwa 
Fatemiyoun 
Shia Afghan 
Muslims (this 
is a foreign 
militia trained 
by Iran) 
Irregular 
armed groups 
Russia, Iran, 
and all 
loyalist 
factions. 
ISIL, all 
opposition 
factions. 
The Ba’ath 
Brigades 
Sunni Arab 
Muslims 
Irregular 
armed groups 
Russia, Iran, 
and all 
loyalist 
factions. 
ISIL, all 
opposition 
factions. 
Syrian Social 
Nationalist 
Party 
n/a Irregular 
armed groups 
Russia, Iran, 
and all 
loyalist 
factions. 
ISIL, all 
opposition 
factions. 
 
Main Syrian 
Opposition 
Factions 
General 
Religious/ 
Ethnic 
Composition 
Armed 
Forces 
Allies Enemies 
The Islamic 
State of Iraq 
and the 
Levant 
(“ISIL”) 
Sunni Arab 
Muslims 
Irregular 
armed groups 
Some minor 
Islamist 
opposition 
factions, 
Turkey 
(alleged). 
Russia, Iran, 
all loyalist, 
Kurdish, and 
opposition 
factions. 
Jabhat Fateh 
al-Sham 
(“JAN”) 
(formerly 
Jabhat al-
Nusrah) 
Sunni Arab 
Muslims 
Irregular 
armed groups 
Other Islamist 
opposition 
factions and 
some factions 
within the 
FSA. 
Russia, Iran, 
all loyalist 
factions, ISIL, 
some factions 
within the 
FSA.  
Free Syrian 
Army (“FSA”) 
Sunni Arab 
Muslims 
Irregular 
armed groups 
United States, 
France, Saudi 
Arabia, 
Turkey, 
Qatar, IF, 
some factions 
of JAN. 
Russia, Iran, 
all loyalist 
factions; IF, 
some factions 
of JAN. 
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Main Syrian 
Opposition 
Factions 
General 
Religious/ 
Ethnic 
Composition 
Armed 
Forces 
Allies Enemies 
Islamic Front 
(“IF”) 
Sunni Arab 
Muslims 
Irregular 
armed groups 
Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, 
JAN, FSA,  
Russia, Iran, 
all loyalist 
factions; ISIL, 
Syrian 
Kurdistan. 
 
Syrian 
Kurdish 
Factions 
General 
Religious/ 
Ethnic 
Composition 
Armed 
Forces 
Allies Enemies 
Syrian 
Kurdistan 
(Rojava) 
Sunni 
Kurdish 
Muslims 
The People’s 
Protection 
Units (“YPG”) 
and the 
Women’s 
Protection 
Units (“YPJ”) 
which are 
both irregular 
armed groups 
Combined 
Joint Task 
Force – 
Operation 
Inherent 
Resolve (US 
led anti-ISIL 
military 
coalition), 
Russia, some 
groups of the 
FSA, 
currently have 
a truce with 
loyalist 
factions. 
Turkey, ISIL, 
JAN, some 
factions 
within IF, 
some other 
Islamist 
opposition 
factions.  
Table(s): Overview of the Syrian Civil War1 
 
 1. See generally Elliot Friedland, Who’s Who in the Syrian Civil War, 
CLARION PROJECT, https://www.clarionproject.org/factsheet/whos-who-syrian-
war# (last visited Feb. 28, 2017) (identifying and explaining the involved parties 
to the Syrian Civil War); see also Kathy Gilsinan, The Confused Person’s Guide 
to the Syrian Civil War, ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2015/10/syrian-civil-war-guide-isis/410746/; 
Hashmatallah Moslih, Iran ‘Foreign Legion’ Leans on Afghan Shia in Syria 
War, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/iran-
foreign-legion-leans-afghan-shia-syria-war-160122130355206.html (explaining 
how an estimated 20,000 Afghan Shia fighters fight with Iranian troops on 
behalf of the Assad regime); Mona Mahmood & Martin Chulov, Syrian War 
Widens Sunni-Shia Schism as Foreign Jihadis Join Fight for Shrines, 
GUARDIAN (June 4, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/04/
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Since the drafting of the United Nations (“UN”) Charter, 
many states have engaged in acts of armed intervention abroad. 
These states have justified such actions on the grounds of 
individual or collective self-defense, often claiming their troops 
were lawfully invited onto foreign soil by another state. In 
September 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin justified 
Russia’s intervention in the Syrian Civil War in support of the 
Syrian government in the following terms: 
Russia has always been firm and consistent in opposing 
terrorism in all its forms. Today, we provide military and 
technical assistance both to Iraq and Syria that are 
fighting terrorist groups. We think it is an enormous 
mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian 
government and its Armed Forces, who are valiantly 
fighting terrorism face-to-face. We should finally 
acknowledge that no one but President Assad’s Armed 
Forces and Kurd Militia are truly fighting the Islamic 
State and other terrorist organizations in Syria.2 
The government of Syria since 2011 has been fighting insurgent 
groups, which control vast swathes of territory within Syria, and 
both government and opposition forces have committed war 
crimes and other egregious human rights violations as a matter 
of systemic policy.3 While Russian military involvement was 
 
syria-islamic-sunni-shia-shrines-volunteers; Aron Lund, The Baath Battalions 
Move Into Damascus, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54167?lang=en; Nour Samaha, The Eagles of the 
Whirlwind, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 28, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/28
/the-eagles-of-the-whirlwind/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&
utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=Flashpoints (explaining the 
SSNP’s participation in the civil war). 
 2. Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation, Statement at 
the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly 6 (Sept. 28, 2015) (unofficial 
translation), http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_RU_
EN.pdf; see also Who Is Fighting Whom in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/middleeast/the-syria-conflicts-
overlapping-agendas-and-competing-visions.html (explaining that Russia 
backs Assad’s regime). 
 3. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/30/48 (Aug. 13, 2015) [hereinafter UNHRC Report] (explaining how 
parties to the conflict “[c]onduct hostilities with little, if any, regard for the laws 
of war and, in particular, its foundational principle of distinction”); LAW AND 
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initially limited to airstrikes and the provision of armaments, 
Russian ground troops have increasingly become involved in 
Syrian government offensives, despite President Putin’s recent 
announcement of a partial Russian withdrawal from the 
conflict.4 The Russian intervention raises questions regarding 
the legality of one state invoking self-defense, humanitarian 
intervention, or intervention by invitation as a basis for 
intervening in another state’s internal armed conflict, where the 
inviting government lacks effective control of the nation’s 
territory. State governments have a sovereign right under 
international law to invite foreign troops onto their territory but 
that right can erode or vanish in situations of internal armed 
conflict, as in Syria, where the legal legitimacy of an inviting 
government becomes uncertain.5 The intervention also raises 
questions regarding the potential liability incurred from willing 
collaboration with a government engaged in systemic human 
rights violations. 
The civil war in Syria developed out of a period of civil 
unrest, beginning in March 2011 as part of the Arab Spring, 
when mass demonstrations against the dictatorial regime of 
President Bashar al-Assad began.6 The Assad regime responded 
 
WAR IN SYRIA 3 (Willem-Jan Van Der Wolf & Claudia Tofan eds., 2013); Syria: 
‘Shoot to Kill’ Commanders Named: Security Council Should Refer Syria to ICC 
for Crimes Against Humanity, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 15, 2011), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/15/syria-shoot-kill-commanders-named. 
 4. See William Watkinson, War on Isis: ‘Hero’ Russian Special Forces 
Soldier Calls Airstrike on Himself to Kill Daesh Fighters, INT’L BUS. TIMES 
(Mar. 25, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/war-isis-hero-russian-special-forces-
soldier-calls-airstrike-himself-kill-daesh-fighters-1551636; Report of the 
Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab 
Republic, MINISTRY DEF. RUSSIAN FED’N (Mar. 26, 2016), http://eng.mil.ru/en/
news_page/country/more.htm?id=12081622@egNews (“In the course of last 24 
hours, near [Palmyra, Homs province], the Russian Aerospace Forces have 
performed 40 sorties engaging 158 objects of terrorists.”); Second Group of 
Russian Sappers Arrived at Hmeymim Airbase in Syria, MINISTRY DEF. 
RUSSIAN FED’N (Apr. 1, 2016), http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.
htm?id=12082062@egNews (explaining Russian mine clearing operations in 
Palmyra, Syria). 
 5. See Christopher J. Le Mon, Unilateral Intervention by Invitation in 
Civil Wars: The Effective Control Test Tested, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741, 
742–43 (2003); see also Yoram Dinstein, Comments on War, 27 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 877, 882 (2004) (“Absent authorization by the Security Council, the 
only licit use of force today by one State against another—under both the 
Charter and customary international law—is in self-defense against an armed 
attack, and this is true whether the action is taken individually (by the direct 
victim of an armed attack) or collectively (by third States coming to the 
assistance of the victim State).”). 
 6. Alexander De Juan & André Bank, The Ba’athist Blackout? Selective 
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to these protests by imprisoning, torturing, and killing 
thousands of opposition protestors, and, by June of 2011, an 
armed insurrection seeking the overthrow of the regime had 
emerged.7 Opposition insurgents, who are predominantly Sunni 
Arab, have since fractured into numerous groups, which include 
moderate groups backed by Western nations, such as the Free 
Syrian Army, as well as hardline Islamist groups, such as 
Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (al-Qaeda in Syria), and the Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”).8 ISIL is also at war with various 
Kurdish militias who control much of northern Syria, and who 
are backed by a Western led military coalition in the form of 
airstrikes against ISIL.9 The Syrian government has received 
military assistance in the form of financing, weapons, special 
operations troops, and air support from Russia and Iran while 
many of the major opposition rebel groups have received 
weapons from Turkey and certain Sunni Arab Gulf States 
opposed to Syria and Iran.10 In July 2015, following a series of 
military defeats and rebel territorial gains, the Assad regime 
made a formal request to Russia for airstrikes targeting rebel 
groups.11 Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned Western 
military support for opposition rebels as “attempts to undermine 
 
Goods Provision and Political Violence in the Syrian Civil War, 52(1) J. PEACE 
RES. 91, 93–94 (2015); see also Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS (Oct. 
9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868. 
 7. Syria: The Story of the Conflict, supra note 6; see also LAW AND WAR IN 
SYRIA, supra note 3, at 3. 
 8. See generally sources cited supra note 6 (explaining the origins of the 
Syrian Civil War and the various parties to the conflict). 
 9. See generally id. (explaining ISIL’s alignment in relation to other 
groups in the Syrian Civil War). 
 10. See Laila Bessam & Tom Perry, How Iranian General Plotted Out 
Syrian Assault in Moscow, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2015/10/06/us-mideast-crisis-syria-soleimani-insigh-idUSKCN0S02BV
20151006; see also Ilya Arkhipov, Stephan Kravechencko & Henry Meyer, Putin 
Officials Said to Admit Real Syria Goal is Far Broader, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 
2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-19/putin-officials-
said-to-admit-real-syrian-goals-are-far-broader; Russia Arming Syria to 
Counter Terrorism: Russian Weapons Will Help the Syrian Army Defeat 
Terrorism, SPUTNIK NEWS (Sept. 9, 2015), http://sputniknews.com/middle
east/20150909/1026775138/russia-syria-weapons.html#ixzz3sSkuEahK; 
Russia Carries Out First Air Strikes in Syria: Russian Bombs Target Positions, 
Vehicles and Warehouses that Moscow Believes Belong to ISIL, Defence 
Minister Says, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
2015/09/russian-carries-air-strikes-syria-150930133155190.html; see generally 
sources cited supra note 6 (explaining the origins of the Syrian Civil War and 
the various parties to the conflict); sources cited supra note 4 (explaining 
Russian and Iranian assistance in the Syrian Civil War). 
 11. Russia Carries Out First Air Strikes in Syria, supra note 10. 
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the authority and legitimacy of the United Nations” and to 
“export revolutions” against a sovereign government.12 The 
Russian Air Force began bombing opposition rebel targets 
within Syria in late September 2015.13 These airstrikes have 
succeeded in drastically shifting the momentum of the war in the 
Assad regime’s favor as the Syrian Arab Army (“SAA”) and pro-
Assad paramilitary fighters in the National Defense Forces 
(“NDF”) have advanced on multiple fronts aided with Russian 
air support, as was recently shown in the encirclement and 
capture of the city Aleppo by the SAA.14 
Russia’s attempted rescue of the faltering Assad regime 
likely carries several potential consequences under 
international law. If the Russian decision to intervene in Syria’s 
civil war is unlawful, then the Russian nation might be held 
liable for its breach of international obligations. This Note will 
examine three questions in the context of the Russian decision 
to intervene: First, may the government of a state legally invite 
another state to assist it in winning its own civil war? Second, if 
such invitations to intervene are lawful, is the legality of such 
interventions affected by the human rights record of the inviting 
state? Finally, if human rights concerns do not factor into the 
legality of interventions by invitation under international law, 
should they? The heinous and widespread atrocities committed 
against combatants and civilians alike, by members of the SAA 
and NDF, may also implicate Russian military commanders and 
political leaders. This Note will also analyze such potential 
issues of individual criminal liability, which will hinge on the 
current state of international humanitarian law, human rights 
law, and international criminal law. 
 
 12. Putin, supra note 2, at 3, 4. 
 13. See Who is Fighting Whom in Syria, supra note 2. 
 14. See generally Raja Abdulrahim, Syrian Forces, Helped by Russian 
Airstrikes, Seize Rebel Stronghold: Advances in Northwestern Lataika 
Province Put Assad Regime in Striking Distance of Region Uunder Opposition 
Control, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrian-forces-
helped-by-russian-airstrikes-seize-rebel-stronghold-1453663114; What Comes 
Next in Aleppo?, AL MASDAR NEWS (Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/comes-next-aleppo/; sources cited supra 
note 4 (explaining Russian and Iranian assistance in the Syrian Civil War). 
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A. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT (JUS AD BELLUM): 
REGULATING THE RESORT TO USE OF FORCE AND STATE 
LIABILITY FOR WAGING WAR 
International law regulates the decision by States to go to 
war (jus ad bellum) and the sub-category of international 
humanitarian law (“IHL”), also referred to as the law of armed 
conflict or law of war, regulates the conduct of forces while 
engaged in armed conflicts (jus in bello). IHL also defines the 
conduct and obligations of all parties and persons involved in an 
armed conflict. International law jus ad bellum, as such, 
concerns any breach of the non-use of force principle, such as 
crimes against peace or waging a war of aggression. IHL applies 
only in situations involving an “armed conflict” and operates 
differently in situations of international and non-international 
(internal) armed conflicts. Only in international armed conflicts 
do the protections of all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
apply in their entirety, and, for states who have ratified it, those 
of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions as well. In 
contrast, non-international armed conflicts are covered by only 
the minimal humanitarian protections of Article 3 common to all 
four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Common Article 3), the 
universally applicable peremptory norms of IHL and human 
rights law, the domestic law of the state experiencing the 
internal armed conflict, and potentially Additional Protocol II to 
the Geneva Conventions.15 Given the intensity of the internal 
conflict, the absence of open or significant participation of the 
foreign State’s armed forces against the Assad government, and 
the degree of organization of the Syrian opposition rebel groups 
 
 15. See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 22–27 (2010); see also Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 26 I.L.M. 
568 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. 
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exerting effective control of territory, the civil war within the 
territorial borders of Syria is most likely an internal armed 
conflict within IHL.16 
The sources of international law include treaty law, 
customary international law, and jus cogens (peremptory) 
norms, which are considered so fundamental to international 
law, and which are accepted by nations so universally that no 
derogation from them is permissible.17 Violations of certain 
peremptory norms confer universal jurisdiction for any nation to 
apprehend and prosecute violators in their domestic courts, and 
such violators are deemed enemies of humanity.18 Peremptory 
norms, including the principles of non-intervention, the 
prohibition of the use of force, self-defense, and the prohibition 
against torture, may apply to individuals or states and are 
relevant to analyzing the Russian intervention. 
 
 16. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 142 (explaining the test for the existence 
of armed conflict focuses on the “intensity of the conflict and the organization of 
the parties to the conflict”); see also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, IV 
COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION 49–50, art. 3.1 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 
1952), https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?viewComments=
LookUpCOMART&articleUNID=A4E145A2A7A68875C12563CD0051B9AE; 
see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Defense Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort 
to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State.”); Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMM. OF 
THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_view
States=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=475. 
 17. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (“The Court . . . shall 
apply: (a) international conventions . . . (b) international custom, as evidence of 
a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations; (d) . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.”); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 
53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (holding that treaty 
laws are void if they conflict with a peremptory norm of international law); 
VCLT, supra art. 64 (“If a new peremptory norm of general international law 
emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void 
and terminates.”); LAW AND WAR IN SYRIA, supra note 3, at 41. 
 18. TERRY GILL & DIETER FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 502–27 (2d ed. 2015). 
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1. The Prohibition of the Use of Force, the Non-Intervention 
Principle, Self-Defense, and Intervention by Invitation 
The prohibition on the use of military force, in the absence 
of an explicit authorization by the United Nations Security 
Council or for means other than self-defense, has become a 
peremptory norm of international law as has the customary 
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of nations.19 
The non-use of force principle, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter, directs that “[a]ll members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state,” and 
is directed at inter-state conflicts.20 This prohibition on the use 
of force by nations as a matter of political policy does not prohibit 
nations from invoking their customary right to use force in self-
defense.21 Article 51 of the UN Charter states that all nations 
have an “[i]nherent right of individual or collective self-defence 
if an armed attack occurs . . . until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.”22 Both individual and collective self-defense require an 
“armed attack” to occur against a state, and in the case of 
collective self-defense against a state which invites a foreign 
state to intervene and consents to the presence of foreign troops 
on its territory.23 IHL in any exercise of self-defense requires 
that the core legal norms applicable to armed conflicts be 
observed by State and non-State parties to the conflict, and those 
norms are the principles of distinction, military necessity, 
 
 19. See Karine Bannelier & Theodore Christakis, Under the UN Security 
Council’s Watchful Eyes: Military Intervention by Invitation in the Malian 
Conflict, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 855, 862 (2013); see also U.N. Charter arts. 2, 
39–42. 
 20. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 21. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 176 (June 27) (“Moreover, a definition 
of the ‘armed attack’ which, if found to exist, authorizes the exercise of the 
‘inherent right’ of self-defence, is not provided in the Charter, and is not part of 
treaty law. It cannot therefore be held that Article 51 is a provision which 
‘subsumes and supervenes’ customary international law. It rather 
demonstrates that in the field in question, the importance of which for the 
present dispute need hardly be stressed, customary international law continues 
to exist alongside treaty law. The areas governed by the two sources of law thus 
do not overlap exactly, and the rules do not have the same content. This could 
also be demonstrated for other subjects, in particular for the principle of non-
intervention.”). 
 22. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 23. See generally Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14. 
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proportionality, and the prohibition against causing 
unnecessary suffering.24 
Certain exceptions to Article 2(4)’s general prohibition on 
the use of force have been asserted by legal scholars and through 
state practice, including humanitarian intervention and the 
intervention by invitation exception, which overlaps with 
collective self-defense considerably, but the legality of these 
exceptions has proven to be highly controversial.25 The consent 
of one host nation for another nation to militarily intervene in 
its own territory “is generally recognized as a ground for 
precluding the wrongfulness of an act which would otherwise be 
illegal under international law,” including military 
interventions which would otherwise violate Article 2(4), or 
where no right to self-defense exists under certain conditions.26 
The Russian position that it was invited to intervene by the 
legitimate government of Syria could be described as a collective 
self-defense justification, and President Putin’s statements of 
the presence of Russian citizens fighting in opposition rebel 
groups could be interpreted as a justification for individual self-
defense. 
2. The Doctrines of State Responsibility and Attribution 
States invited to intervene are still bound by international 
law, as the inviting state may not grant more authority than it 
itself possesses.27 International law holds states accountable for 
their wrongful acts, such as violations of the non-intervention 
principle or other peremptory norms, under the doctrines of 
state responsibility and attribution.28 State responsibility 
attaches legal liability for a state’s commission of internationally 
wrongful acts to that state, and the doctrine of attribution 
determines when a state should be held liable for such acts 
 
 24. See id. ¶ 176; see also SOLIS, supra note 15, at 250. 
 25. Ahmed Ali M. Khayre, Self-Defence, Intervention by Invitation, or 
Proxy War? The Legality of the 2006 Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, 22 AFR. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 208, 211 (2014). 
 26. See GILL & FLECK, supra note 18, at 252. 
 27. Id. at 253. 
 28. See James Crawford, The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 874, 876 (2002) 
(“To be precise, the key idea is that a breach of a primary obligation gives rise, 
immediately by operation of the law of state responsibility, to a secondary 
obligation or series of such obligations (cessation, reparation . . . ).”). 
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under state responsibility.29 The doctrine of attribution requires 
proof of a causal connection between an act or omission of state, 
or state organ, and a breach of an international obligation to 
attribute liability to such state under international law.30 Russia 
thus remains bound by international law in its decision to enter 
the Syrian conflict, as well as for the conduct of their political 
leaders and military forces with respect to the civil war in Syria, 
and any actors within Syria deemed to be organs of the Russian 
State may make Russia liable for any breaches of international 
law caused by such actors under state responsibility. 
B. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND CRIMINAL LAW (JUS 
IN BELLO): REGULATING THE CONDUCT OF INDIVIDUAL 
PARTICIPANTS IN ARMED CONFLICT AND PRESCRIBING 
PUNISHMENTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1. IHL Will Govern the Conduct of Russian Military and 
Political Leaders in  Relation to Syria and 
International Criminal Law Prescribes Punishments for 
Any Violations of IHL 
Jus in bello regulates the conduct of individuals once an 
armed conflict has begun and includes criminal sanctions for 
actions designated by IHL as war crimes.31 IHL is divided into 
two strands of law, the (1) Geneva Law, or humanitarian law 
governing the protections afforded to individuals in armed 
 
 29. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10, at 63, art. 1 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 ILC Report] (“Every 
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility 
of that State.”), at 177, art. 21 (“The wrongfulness of an act of a State is 
precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in 
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.”). 
 30. Id. at 68, art. 2 (“There is an internationally wrongful act of a State 
when conduct consisting of an act or omission: (a) Is attributable to the State 
under international law; and (b) Constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation of the State.”), at 74, art. 3, at 84, art. 4(1) (“The conduct of any State 
organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law . . . “), at 
92, art. 5 (“The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State 
under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise 
elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State 
under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity 
in the particular instance.”), at 95, art. 6 (“The conduct of an organ placed at 
the disposal of a State by another State shall be considered an act of the former 
State under international law if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements 
of the governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed.”). 
 31. SOLIS, supra note 15, at 22, 301–02. 
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conflict and limitations on means available to participants in 
armed conflict, and (2) Hague Law, which defines armed 
combatants and assesses the legality of military objectives and 
regulates the methods of armed warfare generally.32 Core IHL 
peremptory norms, derived from these sources of law and state 
practice, include the principles of proportionality, unnecessary 
suffering, military necessity, and distinction. These principles 
together generally allow attacking armed forces, who have 
conducted a prior collateral damage analysis, to carry out 
proportionate attacks against military objectives even when it is 
known that some civilian deaths or injuries will occur.33 Such 
attacks are lawful under IHL when the resulting civilian 
casualties are not disproportionate to the military advantage 
gained from the attack, so long as civilians are distinguished 
from armed combatants and not directly targeted, and so long as 
weapons incapable of meeting the distinction requirement or 
which cause unnecessary suffering are not employed.34 
International criminal law (“ICL”) is a category within 
public international law, which aims to prohibit certain acts or 
omissions by individuals, including certain violations of IHL, 
international human rights law, and peremptory norms, and to 
prescribe punishments for such violations.35 As a result of the 
widespread violations of human rights by both regime and 
 
 32. Id. at 22–24. 
 33. See Yoram Dinstein, Direct Participation in Hostilities, 18 TILBURG L. 
REV. 3, 4–5 (2013) (“The essence of the principle of distinction is that civilians 
(or civilian objects) ought to be protected from attack. This protection has three 
dimensions. The first is barring direct attacks against civilians qua civilians . . . 
[t]he second dimension . . . is the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks . . . the 
third dimension . . . [is] known as the principle of proportionality.”). 
 34. See Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the Int’l 
Criminal Court 5 (Feb. 9, 2006) (on file with the International Criminal Court) 
(“A crime occurs if there is an intentional attack directed against civilians 
(principle of distinction) (Article 8(2)(b)(i)) or an attack is launched on a military 
objective in the knowledge that the incidental civilian injuries would be clearly 
excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage (principle of 
proportionality) (Article 8(2)(b)(iv)).”); FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, 
CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 41 (3d ed. 2001) (“The most basic tenet of humanitarian 
law with respect to the employment of means of warfare is the rule laid down 
in Article 22 of the Hague Regulations: ‘The right of belligerents to adopt means 
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.’ The principle was reaffirmed in 
Resolution XXVIII of the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent (Vienna, 1965) and subsequently, in 1968, in Resolution 2444 
(XXIII) of the UN General Assembly.”). 
 35. See KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME: 
FOUNDATIONS AND GENERAL PART 55–56 (2013). 
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opposition forces, these fields of law will bind Russian military 
forces and political leaders with respect to their acts and 
omissions in Syria.36 Russia and Syria have signed but have not 
ratified the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”), yet many of the provisions of that statute have 
developed into peremptory norms of international law.37 Some 
jus cogens norms of IHL applicable to the Russian intervention 
on behalf of the Assad regime include the prohibitions against 
torture,38 against genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity,39 and of proportionality.40 All uses of force must 
 
 36. See id. at 54–56. 
 37. LAW AND WAR IN SYRIA, supra note 3, at 47 (“Syria is not a party to the 
Rome Statute, and therefore the International Criminal Court may not exercise 
jurisdiction over war crimes alleged to have been committed by on its territory 
unless the situation is referred to the Court by the UN Security Council.”). 
 38. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 156 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (noting that the ICTY 
has recognized this norm, which it has said confers universal jurisdiction for 
every State “to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals 
accused of torture, who are present in a territory under its jurisdiction.”); see 
also Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(f), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 37 I.L.M. 1002 
(1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 39. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 6 (“For the purpose of this Statute, 
‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed with [mens rea] intent to 
[actus reus] destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or 
in part . . . “), art. 7(1) (“ For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against 
humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
[mens rea] knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; . . . (e) 
Imprisonment . . . (f) Torture; (g) Rape . . . (h) Persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, . . . or other grounds . . . (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; . . . (k) 
Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.”), art. 8(1)–
(2) (“The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular 
when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission 
of such crimes. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means: (a) Grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the 
following acts against persons or property . . . (i) Wilful killing; (ii) Torture or 
inhuman treatment, . . . (iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury 
to body or health; (iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not 
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; . . . (vi) 
Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of 
fair and regular trial . . . .”). 
 40. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. 51 (stating that the civilian 
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adhere to the principle of proportionality, embedded as a 
peremptory norm by Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, which 
prevents the use of military force in a manner, which 
unnecessarily endangers or harms civilians.41 
2. Individual Criminal Liability and Command 
Responsibility in ICL 
Within ICL there are several ways in which international 
criminal courts, such as the ICC, as well as the internal courts 
of states, may punish violations of IHL or human rights law.42 
Violations of peremptory norms confer universal jurisdiction 
allowing nations to apprehend and charge violators in their own 
courts, and this precedent has been strengthened by the 
customary duty of states to prosecute or hand over such 
violators.43 Modes of liability in ICL pertinent to military 
commanders in armed conflict include individual liability, direct 
command responsibility, and indirect command responsibility.44 
Individual liability means that “[p]ersons who actually commit 
an offence while possessing the requisite mental element are 
criminally responsible.”45 Individual liability can also derive 
from the acts of others as international treaty and customary 
law has taken the position that persons who planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
 
population and individual civilians “shall not be the object of attack” and 
prohibiting indiscriminate attacks), art. 57 (“In the conduct of military 
operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, 
civilians and civilian objects.”). 
 41. Id. art. 52. 
 42. See Marta Bo, The Situation in Libya and the ICC’s Understanding of 
Complementarity in the Context of UNSC-Referred Cases, 25 CRIM. L. F. 505, 
506 (2014) (“Complementarity embodies the concept that the Court was 
designed to ‘supplement . . . rather than supplant domestic enforcement of 
international norms’: in brief, the Court should step in exclusively when states 
fall short of exercising their primary obligation to prosecute crimes falling 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.”). 
 43. See generally Att’y-Gen. of the Gov’t of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I. 
L. R. 5, 287 (1962) (“It is a peculiarly universal character of these crimes that 
vests in every state the authority to try and punish anyone who participated in 
their commission.”). 
 44. See generally INT’L CRIM. LAW SERV., MODULE 9: MODES OF LIABILITY: 
COMMISSION & PARTICIPATION, http://wcjp.unicri.it/deliverables/docs/Module_
9_Modes_of_liability.pdf. 
 45. GILL & FLECK, supra note 18, at 550. 
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planning, preparation, or execution of a crime are individually 
criminally responsible for that crime.46 
Command responsibility derives from the relationship 
between a commander and his subordinates and makes a 
military or civilian commander, who possesses authority to issue 
binding orders to the perpetrator of an international crime, and 
who indirectly or directly orders that perpetrator to commit a 
crime to be held criminally liable for that crime, if it is 
committed.47 Direct command responsibility involves a 
commander’s liability for the wrongful acts of his direct 
subordinates (i.e. soldiers of the same army he is commander of) 
and likely will apply to Russia in Syria only through the direct 
participation of the Russian Air Force and any violations of IHL 
by those forces, as Russian ground troops officially act only in an 
advisory capacity in providing technical assistance to SAA 
ground units and likely do not exercise direct control over SAA 
or Iranian military units.48 Indirect command responsibility 
confers criminal liability to a military commander, for actions 
committed by forces deemed his subordinates, on various 
theories of negligence or recklessness in a commander’s acts or 
omissions.49 Given the reports of widespread atrocities by the 
SAA and forces allied to them, the doctrine of indirect command 
responsibility may bear more serious consequences to the 
Russian intervention in Syria, as the overwhelming majority of 
ground offensives on behalf of the Assad regime are conducted 
by SAA, Iranian, and paramilitary troops friendly to both.50 
 
 46. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 25; Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1600; Statute of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 7, May 25, 
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1163. 
 47. See GILL & FLECK, supra note 18, at 552; see also Prosecutor v. Tihomir 
Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 290 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000) (demonstrating that ICTY judgments are evidence 
that this is a rule of customary international law where a commander or 
superior who issues an order which does not explicitly require that a crime must 
be committed may still be held liable for a crime if he issues an apparently 
lawful order which both he and the recipient understand to implicitly authorize 
the commission of a crime). 
 48. See generally Steve Rosenberg, Syria conflict: Russia’s Build-Up Looks 
Long-Term, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-35391241 (describing the deployment of ground troops to guard air 
bases and the fact that the Russian offensive combat operations are currently 
limited to airstrikes and bombardments). 
 49. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 381–96. 
 50. See Martin Chulov, Saeed Kamali Dehghan & Patrick Wintour, Iran 
Hails Victory in Aleppo as Shia Militias Boost Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, 
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Furthermore, mounting evidence suggests that some SAA 
offensives are conducted under the supervision of Russian 
commanders or with the cooperation of Russian special forces 
units.51 
C. CONCLUSORY REMARKS 
The UN Charter’s prohibition of the use of force in the 
absence of a corresponding Security Council authorization is 
limited by a peremptory norm for a state to exercise its right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs, as 
well as by the lawful invitation of a legitimate state government 
to intervene on its soil.52 Identifying what events qualify as an 
“armed attack” and which entities constitute a state’s 
“government” competent to invite intervention in cases of 
internal armed conflicts, such as in Syria, are unresolved issues 
within international law.53 The doctrines of state responsibility 
and attribution provide that a state’s use of force in any 
circumstance must be carried out in accordance with 
international law, or that state risks incurring liability for its 
breach of international obligations.54 Determining the legality of 
the decision by Russian political leaders to intervene in Syria 
and any potential corresponding legal liability the Russian State 
might incur will be the first issue this Note will address. 
Russian military personnel and their superiors may clearly 
be held individually liable for the commission of international 
crimes, but to what degree may Russian military commanders 
be held liable as commanders for the actions of their Syrian and 
Iranian allies? Can Russian military advisors and officers be 
said to exercise the degree of control over Syrian military 
personnel to attach command liability for their crimes? Russian 
 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/14/
iran-aleppo-syria-shia-militia. 
 51. See Siobhan O’Grady & Reid Standish, Russian Troops in Syria will 
‘Stay Until the End’, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 22, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/
2015/10/22/russian-troops-in-syria-will-stay-until-the-end/ (speculating that an 
SAA offensive in Latakia Province is being led by Russian generals). 
 52. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, art. 51; see also GILL & FLECK, supra note 18, 
at 229. 
 53. Le Mon, supra note 5, at 748–49 (explaining that inconsistencies 
between the effective control test and standards of belligerency test have 
created incoherency in international law regarding invitations to intervene). 
 54. See Crawford, supra note 28, at 876. See generally 2001 ILC Report, 
supra note 29. 
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airstrikes in support of the military objectives of the SAA and its 
allies, so long as they meet certain IHL standards of 
proportionality, are not in and of themselves violations of 
international law, but they still amount to collaboration with a 
regime responsible for grave human rights violations and 
present a new and uncertain collision of jus in bello 
considerations with jus ad bellum justifications for going to war, 
and may be resolved through the development of new 
peremptory norms of international law. 
II. ANALYSIS 
The Russian intervention in Syria is likely permissible 
under international law as individual self-defense, collective 
self-defense, or under the legally vague intervention by 
invitation exception to the non-intervention principle. The UN 
Security Council is powerless to authorize the use of force in the 
case of Syria, as Russia and China have vetoed any resolution 
directed against the Assad government, leaving self-defense and 
intervention by invitation as the only applicable justifications 
available to Russia.55 Article 51 of the UN Charter preserves the 
customary and “[i]nherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs,”56 although the precise 
definition of what constitutes an “armed attack” and whether 
the Assad regime was subjected to one is unclear. The legality of 
Russian airstrikes aiding the Assad controlled Syrian Arab 
Republic (“SAR”) remain questionable, as the legal legitimacy of 
the Assad government will control whether the SAR was legally 
competent to invite the Russian intervention.57 Recent state 
practice suggests that the Russian intervention is permissible as 
individual self-defense as thousands of Russian citizens, who 
have formerly served in Islamist groups which have carried out 
major attacks on Russian soil, are currently serving within the 
ranks of IS and other Islamist rebel groups.58 An analysis of 
 
 55. See Ian Black, Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to 
International Criminal Court, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2014), http://www.the
guardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russia-china-veto-un-draft-resolution-refer-
syria-international-criminal-court; James Reinl, Syria’s War and Veto-Wielding 
UN Powerplays, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/in
depth/features/2015/09/syria-war-veto-wielding-powerplays-
150930064603153.html. 
 56. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 57. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115. 
 58. See Kim Sengupta, Russia in Syria: President Putin’s Middle East 
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recent developments in IHL reveals that the Russian 
intervention in Syria is most likely justified under the 
intervention by invitation exception to Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter, as Russia has not justified its intervention on 
humanitarian grounds, such as a responsibility to protect 
civilians, nor could it do so in good faith given the extent of the 
Assad regime’s atrocities.59 
Notwithstanding the presumable legality of the 
intervention, Russian civilian and military commanders will 
very likely become criminally liable for the actions of their allies 
in the SAA and other pro-Assad forces under command 
responsibility.60 Less certain is the legality of the Russian 
airstrikes assisting the SAA against opposition rebels as the 
question of whether Russian commanders ordering the 
airstrikes should be held accountable for assisting the military 
forces responsible for grave violations of IHL and human rights 
law remains undetermined. In respect to the latter question, a 
new legal standard prohibiting military cooperation of any kind 
with war criminals and human rights violators should be 
developed, linking jus ad bellum considerations such as the 
legality of a collective self-defense action with jus in bello 
considerations regarding the legality of the actions of 
participants in an armed conflict. This proposed linkage would 
be limited in scope but would attribute liability on a State’s 
civilian leadership for authorizing force, which rendered 
military assistance to a party to an armed conflict, if those 
leaders knew or had reason to know that grave IHL human 
rights violations had been, or were being, committed by the 
recipient of such military assistance. This section will address 
the legality of the Russian intervention, identify the manner in 
which Russian commanders will be likely held criminally liable 
under IHL, and finally will outline the previously mentioned 
proposed legal standard which would seek to limit invocations of 
self-defense and intervention by invitation if the inviting state 
 
Adventure Exposes Terrorist Threat Now Facing Moscow, INDEP. (Oct. 9, 2015), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-in-syria-president-
putins-middle-east-adventure-exposes-terrorist-threat-now-facing-russia-
a6688661.html; Adam Taylor, Why Being Chechen is a Badge of Honor for 
Islamist Militants, WASH. POST (July 3, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/07/03/why-being-chechen-is-a-badge-of-
honor-for-islamist-militants/. 
 59. See Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Rep. 
¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/48 (Aug. 13, 2015). 
 60. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 381–96. 
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has committed grave violations of IHL or human rights law 
during the armed conflict at issue. 
A. INTERVENTION BY INVITATION: THE RUSSIAN 
INTERVENTION IS LIKELY LAWFUL, DUE TO THE 
INVITATION OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT, AND WILL 
REMAIN LAWFUL SO LONG AS RUSSIA LIMITS ITS EXPRESS 
PURPOSE TO FIGHTING TERRORIST GROUPS 
Syria has been recognized as an independent state since 
receiving its independence from France in 1945 and was a 
founding member of the UN.61 Yet, the legal legitimacy of the 
Assad government and its corresponding ability to invite foreign 
intervention is in question given its loss of control over 
considerable amounts of territory to opposition and Kurdish 
rebel groups.62 The question of legitimacy is central to the 
legality of the Russian intervention as only the legitimate 
government may invite foreign intervention, and as the UN 
General Assembly has stated: “[t]he act of calling in the forces of 
a foreign State for the repression of internal disturbances is . . . 
of so serious a character as to justify the expectation that no 
uncertainty should be allowed to exist regarding the actual 
presentation of such a request by a duly constituted 
Government.”63 The SAR has not been formally recognized as 
the legitimate government of Syria by most states, but a 
government’s legal legitimacy is determined by the effective 
control principle rather than by state recognition.64 For the 
Russian intervention in Syria to be lawful as intervention by 
invitation there must, firstly, be an invitation made by the 
legitimate government of a “state” and, secondly, the scope of the 
 
 61. Activities of the Member States, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/
depts/dhl/unms/founders.shtml (last visited March 1, 2017). 
 62. See Khayre, supra note 25, at 225. But see Le Mon, supra note 5, at 
748–49. 
 63. Rep. of the Special Comm. on the Problem of Hung., ¶ 266, U.N. Doc. 
A/3592 (1957) (concluding that there was insufficient evidence that a lawful 
invitation by the Hungarian state had been made). 
 64. See THOMAS ERLICH & MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE USE OF FORCE 138–40 (1993); see also Kerstin Odendahl, National and 
International Legitimacy of Governments, 4 EUR. SOC’Y INT’L L. 1 (2015) 
(explaining that most states have withdrawn from recognizing or have never 
recognized the Syrian Arab Republic yet Russia and China continue to); Brian 
Rohan, Bashar Assad’s Battlefield Gains Cast Loud on Upcoming Syria Talks, 
WASH. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/
19/assads-battlefield-gains-cast-cloud-on-upcoming-sy/?page=all. 
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invited intervention must not violate the peremptory norm of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of another state.65 
Furthermore, collective self-defense requires, in addition to the 
necessity and proportionality requirements of self-defense 
generally, an “armed attack,” the consent of the inviting state to 
the presence of foreign military troops, and a request for help.66 
In brief, the legality of the intervention hinges on the legitimacy 
of the SAR, the nature of its internal armed conflict, and the 
state of IHL given recent state practice in the global War on 
Terrorism. 
1. State Recognition and Effective Control in Internal 
Armed Conflict: Recent State Practice on Intervention by 
Invitation Favors Classifying the Russian Intervention 
as Permissible under IHL 
The legal determination of whether a political entity 
constitutes a “state” in international law is complex but the 
declaratory view of statehood, espoused in the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention, currently predominates.67 Under the standards of 
that treaty it is debatable whether Syria remains a “state” or 
whether it is in the process of dissolution into several 
independent states, Syria arguably possesses a permanent 
population and defined territory but it has no “government” 
which exercises effective control over all of its territory, even 
though the Assad-led SAR continues to represent Syria in the 
 
 65. See Bannelier & Christakis, supra note 19, at 861 (“Louise Doswald-
Beck referred to the principles of self-determination and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of states to conclude that ‘there is, at the least, a very serious 
doubt whether a State may validly aid another government to suppress a 
rebellion, particularly if the rebellion is widespread and seriously aimed at the 
overthrow of the incumbent regime.’”). 
 66. See Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia, Vol. II, at 286 (Sept. 2009), http://echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_
38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf (explaining that self-defense cannot be legitimate 
without meeting all its conditions); see also Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 
¶¶ 297, 313 (explaining necessity and proportionality as requirements for 
legitimate self-defense). 
 67. Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 
3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention] (“The state as a 
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity 
to enter into relations with the other states.”); see also Robert D. Sloane, The 
Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet, 16 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 107, 117 (2002) (explaining that the declaratory view 
[Montevideo Convention] of recognition predominates in international law). 
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UN and can be said to have the capacity to enter into foreign 
relations on behalf of Syria.68 International law traditionally 
allowed only a government which exercised effective (de facto) 
control over their State’s territory to invite foreign nations to 
intervene under certain conditions, including in suppressing an 
insurgency, but conversely in states of internal conflict rebel 
forces could not invite such interventions unless they controlled 
enough territory to constitute “a belligerency.”69 
While the belligerency analysis has fallen out of favor, in 
theory the effective control test still determines the legitimacy 
of whether a political entity represents the “government” of a 
state. Interpreting “effective control” narrowly to mean anything 
less than undisputed de facto governmental authority over a 
nation’s internal territory would bar any nation in the midst of 
a civil war from inviting foreign intervention, and some legal 
scholars have stated that control of most of the national territory 
is sufficient to meet the effective control test.70 Recent state 
practice and the UN do not endorse such a narrow view of the 
effective control test within customary international law, and in 
several recent cases the UN has either acquiesced to or implicitly 
endorsed interventions in situations of civil war which would 
seem to violate the test.71 
In 2013, French forces launched Operation Serval at the 
invitation of the Malian government and drove out Islamist 
rebels, which had occupied over half of Mali’s territory, and, in 
spite of a lack of an explicit Security Council authorization, the 
UN expressed its view that the intervention was conducted in 
accordance with international law.72 Operation Serval was 
 
 68. See generally Interview with Fabrice Balanche, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace (Jan. 30, 2015), http://carnegieendowment.org/
syriaincrisis/?fa=58875 (“The Syrian government [as of 1/30/2015] controls 
around 50 percent of the territory, but it rules between 55 and 72 percent of the 
population left inside Syria. The rebels control 45 percent of the territory and 
17–34 percent of the population, while the Kurds control no more than 5 percent 
of the territory with 5–10 percent of the population.”). 
 69. ERLICH & O’CONNELL, supra note 64, at 138–40. 
 70. See Dinstein, supra note 5, at 888 (“The fact that the Taliban regime 
was in control of most of the territory of Afghanistan meant that—recognized 
or not—it was the de facto Government, and the regime’s actions had to ‘be 
treated as the actions of the state of Afghanistan.’”). 
 71. See Le Mon, supra note 5, at 790–91 (“The positive reaction of the 
international community to long-term Russian intervention [in Tajikistan’s 
Civil War], an intervention that the standards of belligerency strictly would 
have prohibited, displays the continued dissonance between these principles of 
law and post-Charter state action.”). 
 72. See Bannelier & Christakis, supra note 19, at 865–67. 
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distinguishable from the Russian intervention, in that the 
invitation for the French to intervene came from a government 
whose legal legitimacy no nation had disputed, and because the 
French military limited their focus solely to groups classified as 
terrorist organizations by the UN.73 This unconditioned UN 
approval of Operation Serval, in spite of prior French misgivings 
about intervening at the invitation of the Central African 
Republic during a period of internal unrest,74 indicate that even 
a government which controls less than half of the physical 
territory of a state may invite a foreign army to destroy 
designated terrorist groups on its own soil under international 
law.75 Nevertheless, such recent state practice demonstrates the 
unsettled state of international law on the legitimacy of 
governments in times of internal conflict as well as the manner 
in which the non-intervention principle may be skirted by 
classifying the opponents of an inviting state as terrorist groups, 
which both Russia and the SAR have done.76 
2. Non-Intervention and the War on Terrorism: It is Likely 
that the Assad Regime Remains the Government of the 
State of Syria, and Lawfully Requested Russian Military 
Assistance 
Syria is politically dominated by the Arab Socialist Ba’ath 
Party.77 Since elements of that party seized control of the Syrian 
government in 1963, and since Ba’athist General Hafez al-Assad 
took control of the government during the Corrective Revolution 
of November 13, 1970, Syria has been ruled by the Assad family, 
members of the minority Alawite sect of Shia Islam.78 Hafez al-
Assad ruled until his death in 2000 whereby his son Bashar 
succeeded him as President and as the head of the ruling Ba’ath 
Party. And although the SAR Constitution was revised in 2012 
to leave the exercise of the SAR’s sovereignty to “[t]he people,” 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 864. 
 75. Id. at 865–67; see also Le Mon, supra note 5, at 790–91. 
 76. See Putin: No Need to Distinguish Between ‘Moderate’ & Other 
Terrorists, RUSS. TODAY (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.rt.com/news/319405-
putin-valdai-discussion-club/. 
 77. See Michael Bröning, The Sturdy House that Assad Built: Why 
Damascus is Not Cairo, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 11, 2011), https://www.foreign
affairs.com/articles/syria/2011-03-07/sturdy-house-assad-built. 
 78. See id. 
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the SAR retains single party authoritarian rule.79 Until the 
uprisings of 2011, and their escalation into an internal armed 
conflict, the SAR had continuously exerted control over the 
territory within the defined geographic boundaries of Syria, with 
the exception of a series of revolts led by Islamist political parties 
between 1979 and 1982 and a brief period of rioting in certain 
Kurdish populated cities in 2004, both of which were swiftly 
crushed by the SAA.80 Due to the lack of political unity between 
armed opposition groups in the Syrian Civil War at the present 
time, the SAR likely remains the legitimate government of Syria 
notwithstanding its substantial loss of territorial control as a 
result of the civil war.81 Despite the SAR exerting control of only 
a fraction of the territory of Syria, that zone of territorial control 
includes most of Syria’s major cities, as well as the majority of 
the Syrian population, many of whom support the Assad 
regime.82 The SAR was expelled from multiple regional 
organizations following the uprising, including the Arab League, 
which chose instead to seat members of the Syrian opposition 
rebel groups; however, the SAR government retains its 
representation within the UN and has been repeatedly invited 
to represent itself in peace talks regarding the conflict.83 Iran, a 
 
 79. Id.; see also Article 2, Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic of 2012 
(Amended to remove reference to the Ba’ath Party as the leader of the people 
and stating that “[s]overeignty is an attribute of the people; and no individual 
or group may claim sovereignty. Sovereignty shall be based on the principle of 
the rule of the people by the people and for the people; The People shall exercise 
their sovereignty within the aspects and limits prescribed in the Constitution.”), 
http://sana.sy/en/?page_id=1489. 
 80. See Bröning, supra note 77; see also Robert Fisk, Freedom, Democracy 
and Human Rights in Syria, INDEP. (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.independent.
co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-freedom-democracy-and-human-
rights-in-syria-2080463.html (explaining the eventual suppression of a series of 
Islamist revolts in the 1982 Hama massacre); Albert Aji, Tension Unabated 
After Riots in Syria, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 16, 2004), http://archive.boston.com/
news/world/middleeast/articles/2004/03/16/tension_unabated_after_riots_in_sy
ria/. 
 81. See Bröning, supra note 77; see generally Le Mon, supra note 5. 
 82. See ORB INT’L, Syria Public Opinion – July 2015, https://www.orb-
international.com/perch/resources/syriadata.pdf (showing that 47% said Assad 
was a somewhat or completely positive influence). 
 83. Neil McFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria Over 
Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
11/13/world/middleeast/arab-league-votes-to-suspend-syria-over-its-crack
down-on-protesters.html; Regional Group Votes to Suspend Syria; Rebels Claim 
downing of Jet, CNN (Aug. 14, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/13/
world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html?hpt=hp_t1; Syria Suspends its 
Membership in Mediterranean Union, XINHUA (Dec. 2, 2011), http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-12/01/c_131282989.htm; Syrian 
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principal ally of Assad and the SAR which has sent thousands of 
troops to fight against opposition rebels, notably was also given 
a seat in recent peace negotiations.84 These facts tend to show 
that the SAR was considered the de facto government of a state 
before the uprising began in 2011 and has likely remained one 
since, as no singular opposition group has exceeded its power or 
authority within the territorial boundaries of the Syrian 
nation.85 Indeed the UN Security Council has in at least one 
instance announced that a government which had lost effective 
territorial control in a civil war nevertheless possessed sovereign 
rights over all territory within its national borders, stating that 
the South African occupation of rebel-controlled territory within 
Angola violated the non-intervention principle.86 Since the 
Syrian invitation came from the highest levels of the SAR 
government it is very likely that, if the SAR is the legitimate 
government, its request to Russia for military assistance was 
properly conducted in accordance with the law of armed conflict 
(jus ad bellum).87 
Governments exerting effective (de facto) control over a 
state’s territory may invite foreign troops onto their own soil. 
Howecer, identifying the conditions under which a state may 
invite another state to intervene in its own internal armed 
conflict, where the sovereign authority of a government to invite 
foreign intervention weakens as it loses control over territory to 
rebel groups, is a separate consideration which is supplied with 
 
Opposition Takes Arab League Seat, GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.the
guardian.com/world/2013/mar/26/syrian-opposition-appeals-nato-support. 
 84. Thomas Erdbrink et. al., After a U.S. Shift, Iran Has a Seat at Talks on 
War in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/10/29/world/middleeast/syria-talks-vienna-iran.html. 
 85. See Who Has Gained Ground in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/30/world/middleeast/syria-
control-map-isis-rebels-airstrikes.html. 
 86. See S.C. Res. 602, ¶ 1 (Nov. 25, 1987) (“Strongly condemns [South 
Africa] for its continued and intensified acts of aggression against [the MPLA-
controlled government in Angola] as well as its continuing occupation of parts 
of that State, which constitute a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Angola.”). 
 87. See Walid Al-Moualem, Syrian Arab Republic, Deputy Prime Minister, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Statement at 70th Session of the 
U.N. General Assembly (Oct. 2, 2015), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/
files/gastatements/70/70_SY_en.pdf; Corky Siemaszko, Syrian Government 
Invites Russia to Send in Ground Troops to Protect Assad Regime from ISIS, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/
russia-launches-attacks-syria-day-article-1.2382933. 
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no clear answer.88 State practice has generally evidenced 
customary IHL principles forbidding intervention in another 
nation’s civil war in order to decide the outcome of that war, but 
if the scope of such interventions is strictly limited to clearly 
defined purposes such as fighting terrorism, it may nevertheless 
be permissible under IHL.89 The 2009 European Union Fact 
Finding Mission in Georgia ruled that South Ossetia, a territory 
part of Georgia but recognized as a state by Russia, was not 
legally capable of inviting Russia to militarily intervene against 
Georgia.90 That commission identified three separate legal 
standards on intervention by invitation: the doctrine of 
asymmetry, where “[o]nly the established and internationally 
recognized government can pronounce an invitation with legal 
effect;” the doctrine of negative equality, which means to 
“[a]cknowledge that in a state of civil war, none of the competing 
factions can be said to be effective, stable, and legitimate,” so 
that none is competent to invite outside intervention; and the 
doctrine of positive equality, which holds that outside 
intervention is permissible on behalf of either party to a civil war 
“[f]rom that moment on when in an internal war the control of 
the state’s territory is divided between the warring parties.”91 
The doctrine of asymmetry has been the traditional standard 
under international law, yet, in Syria’s case it provides little 
assistance in determining whether the invitation was lawful, as 
though the Assad family-led SAR has been the “established” 
government of Syria for over four decades, is it not formally 
internationally recognized by most states.92 
In its effective control over territory within Syria’s borders, 
the SAR certainly possesses much more authority as an 
“established and internationally recognized government” than 
did the South Ossetian authorities in 2008, and at least as much 
authority as the collapsing Malian government which invited the 
 
 88. See generally Le Mon, supra note 5 (explaining the effective control 
principle and the uncertain state of international law regarding statehood in 
periods of civil unrest). 
 89. See Bannelier & Christakis, supra note 19, at 864 (“[m]ilitary 
assistance on request is perfectly legal in a series of cases, including the 
hypothesis of joint fight against terrorism.”). 
 90. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia, Vol. I, 1–33, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_09_09_
iiffmgc_report.pdf. 
 91. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia, Vol. II, supra note 66, at 276–80. 
 92. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 64 (explaining the lack of 
international recognition of the Syria Arab Republic). 
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French intervention in 2013.93 As evidence of this, the ICJ 
determined in Nicaragua v. US that the dictatorial regime in El 
Salvador, which had been established by a military coup less 
than ten years before that decision, and which faced an internal 
armed conflict throughout the 1980’s, would have been 
competent to invite foreign intervention under collective self-
defense in the event of an “armed attack.”94 It is also worth 
noting that the composition of opposition rebels has shifted 
dramatically since the start of the war with ISIL entering the 
conflict from Iraq as outsiders to the initially nationalist 
uprising, and quickly becoming the most successful rebel group 
within Syria and Iraq.95 The rule of non-intervention in another 
state’s internal armed conflict is related to the peremptory norm 
of self-determination, whereby a distinct populace may 
determine their own political destiny by taking up arms against 
their own government, yet ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusrah are 
organizations led by outsiders with no direct connection to the 
Syrian nationalist rebel groups which initiated the rebellion.96 
Given this new state of affairs, it is debatable whether the 
considerable foreign state support for such groups, including 
allegations of harboring rebel groups and allowing them to 
 
 93. See Who’s Who in the Syria Conflict, AL MONITOR (Jan. 21, 2017), 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2017/01/syria-conflict-players.html (“The 
government controls 34 percent of Syria’s territory, including key cities such as 
Damascus and second city Aleppo”). 
 94. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 230. 
 95. See generally Samia Nakhoul, Saddam’s Former Army is Secret of 
Baghdadi’s Success, REUTERS (June 16, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-mideast-crisis-baghdadi-insight-idUSKBN0OW1VN20150616; see 
also Patrick Cockburn, Whose Side is Turkey On?, 36 LONDON REV. BOOKS 8, 9 
(2014) (“This was a political problem for the US, as Joe Biden revealed to the 
embarrassment of the administration in a talk at Harvard on 2 October. He said 
that Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had promoted ‘a proxy Sunni-Shia war’ 
in Syria and ‘poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of 
tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad—except that the 
people who were being supplied were al-Nusra and al-Qaida and the extremist 
element of jihadis coming from other parts of the world’. He admitted that the 
moderate Syrian rebels, supposedly central to US policy in Syria, were a 
negligible military force.”). 
 96. See Armed Activities on Territory of Congo, (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 164 (Dec. 19) (noting that the 
Nicaragua case had “made it clear that the principle of non-intervention 
prohibits a State ‘to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed 
force, in support of an internal opposition in another state’”); see also U.N. 
Charter art. 1, ¶ 2 (“The Purposes of the United Nations are . . . To develop 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace.”). 
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attack SAR targets in cross-border operations, could 
“internationalize” Syria’s internal armed conflict and alter the 
applicability of the non-intervention principle to the Russian 
intervention by invitation.97 
B. SELF-DEFENSE: THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION MAY BE 
PERMISSIBLE UNDER IHL AS  INDIVIDUAL OR 
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE, BUT NOT AS ANTICIPATORY 
SELF-DEFENSE 
1. Collective Self-Defense May Justify the Russian 
Intervention if the Conduct of Turkey in Assisting Syrian 
Rebels Rose to the Level of an “Armed Attack” Against 
the Syrian Arab Republic 
Given the likelihood that the SAR continues to remain a 
“state,” the element of international recognition it lacks should 
not defeat its competency to lawfully invite another nation to 
intervene in its conflict. However, even assuming that the SAR 
remains the legitimate government of Syria, Russia can only 
justify this intervention as collective self-defense if the SAR was 
subject to an “armed attack.”98A precise legal definition of 
“armed attack” has remained elusive, but typically such an 
attack would come from the conventional military forces of 
another state, yet there is strong evidence in customary IHL that 
armed irregular groups can initiate armed attacks against states 
provided those groups are backed by another state and provided 
the attack is similar in gravity to those launched by conventional 
forces.99 Imputing the conduct of such irregular groups to 
another state is difficult; the Nicaragua v. United States 
attribution standard requiring evidentiary proof that a state 
“had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations 
in the course of which the alleged violations were committed,” 
and the mere provision of arms to opposition groups in another 
 
 97. See UNHRC Report, supra note 3, ¶ 165 (“The livelihood of the Syrian 
population is subverted daily by the increasingly internationalized nature of 
this non-international armed conflict, as well as the ferocity of confrontations 
at the ground level, compounded by the spread of extremism.”). 
 98. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 211. 
 99. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3(g) (Dec. 14, 1974) (“The sending by or on 
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry 
out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to 
the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.”). 
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country was held by the ICJ not to constitute an “armed 
attack.”100 
In the Syrian Civil War, the military forces of the SAR have 
been waging conventional and asymmetric warfare against 
numerous Islamist and nationalist insurgent groups, who often 
possess armaments and equipment superior to that of the SAA, 
and several of these groups are backed by foreign nations 
seeking the SAR’s overthrow.101 The SAA has fought these 
foreign backed insurgents in conventional battles, such as the 
Siege of Zabadani, with resulting casualties rivaling those that 
the United States military experienced in the Vietnam War.102 
The war has resulted in the deaths of over 250,000 people, 
including soldiers, rebels, and civilians, and in the forced 
displacement of millions of Syrian citizens.103 
Over the course of the war, Turkey has invaded Syria 
briefly, shelled the Syrian town of Kobani, and there is mounting 
evidence that the Turkish government or Turkish intelligence 
services has collaborated with IS in cross-border attacks against 
Syrian Kurdish groups.104 Moreover, there is strong evidence 
 
 100. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (“All the forms of United 
States participation mentioned above, and even the general control by the 
respondent State over a force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not 
in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the United States directed 
or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and 
humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State. Such acts could well be 
committed by members of the contras without the control of the United 
States.”); id. at ¶ 230. 
 101. Arab League Allows Members to Arm Rebels and Offers Seat to 
Opposition, AL BAWABA NEWS (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.albawaba.com/news/
arab-league-syria-475662; Tara McKelvey, Arming Syrian rebels: Where the 
US Went Wrong, BBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33997408. 
 102. See generally Syrian Army, Hezbollah Capture 17 Militants in 
Zabadani, AL BAWABA NEWS (July 27, 2015), http://www.albawaba.com/
news/syrian-army-hezbollah-capture-17-militants-zabadani-723810 
(explaining that 28 SAA and 15 allied Hezbollah were killed in Zabadani in first 
three weeks of assault ); see also Zabadani Battles Have Claimed over 400 
Rebels, 60 Hezbollah Fighters, DAILY STAR NEWS: LEBANON (Sept. 4, 2015), 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Sep-04/313930-
zabadani-battles-have-claimed-over-400-rebels-60-hezbollah-fighters.ashx. 
 103. See Chris York & George Bowden, Syria Civil War Death Toll Paints a 
Horrifyingly Complex Picture, HUFFINGTON POST UK (Oct. 31, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/10/31/syrian-civil-war-death-
_n_8440378.html. 
 104. See generally Barney Guiton, ‘ISIS Sees Turkey as Its Ally’: Former 
Islamic State Member Reveals Turkish Army Cooperation, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 7, 
2014), http://europe.newsweek.com/isis-and-turkey-cooperate-destroy-kurds-
former-isis-member-reveals-turkish-282920?rx=us; Kurdish Forces Accuse 
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that Turkey has openly allowed thousands of foreign nationals 
to pass through its borders and cross into Syria in order to join 
IS and other opposition rebel groups, and, in at least one battle, 
Turkey is suspected of harboring opposition rebels on its 
territory.105 If the ICJ holding in Nicaragua v. US accurately 
states customary IHL, excluding from the definition of “armed 
attack” arming and aiding rebels but including within such 
definition the mining of another state’s harbors,106 then the 
Turkish Army’s shelling of Kurdish-controlled Kobani or the 
Turkish government’s allowance of rebel groups to use its 
territory to stage cross-border attacks would seem to fall under 
the definition of “armed attack.” ICJ precedent held that the 
mere provision of arms to opposition groups in another nation 
was not enough to constitute an armed attack; however, that 
decision was rendered in the context of the conflict between 
Nicaragua and El Salvador, which was a conflict with a lesser 
death toll and the provision of much less sophisticated weaponry 
than in Syria today.107 Indeed, the allegations of Turkey 
 
Turkey of Launching Pro-ISIS Operations in Kobane, ARA NEWS (Aug. 1, 2015), 
http://aranews.net/2015/08/kurdish-forces-acuse-turkey-of-launching-pro-isis-
operations-in-kobane/; Alex MacDonald, Turkey ‘Shells Kobane’ as Kurdish-
Arab Forces Advance on Strategic Town, MIDDLE EAST EYE, (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkish-military-allegedly-shell-kobane-
ypg-and-arabs-advances-strategic-town-1894959234; Syria Crisis: IS Makes 
Deadly Return to Kobane, BBC NEWS (June 25, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-33266399. 
 105. See UN Says ‘25,000 Foreign Fighters’ Joined Islamist Militants, BBC 
NEWS (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32156541?
utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=*Mideast%20Brief&ut
m_campaign=2014_The%20Middle%20East%20Daily; Natasha Bertrand, 
Senior Western Official: Links Between Turkey and ISIS are Now ‘Undeniable’, 
YAHOO! (July 28, 2015), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/links-between-turkey-
isis-now-195700510.html (“Ankara officially ended its loose border policy last 
year, but not before its southern frontier became a transit point for cheap oil, 
weapons, foreign fighters, and pillaged antiquities.”); Patrick Cockburn, Whose 
Side Is Turkey on?, 36 LONDON REV. BOOKS No. 21, 8-10 (Nov. 6, 2014), 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n21/patrick-cockburn/whose-side-is-turkey-on (“When 
Syrian rebels led by al-Nusra captured the Armenian town of Kassab in Syrian 
government-held territory early this year, it seemed that the Turks had allowed 
them to operate from inside Turkish territory.”). 
 106. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 115, 230–31. 
 107. Id. ¶¶ 230–31; see also Richard Johnson, Syrian Rebels Acquire U.S. 
Made Antitank Missiles, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/apps/g/page/world/syrian-rebels-acquire-us-made-antitank-
missiles/980/; Mark Mazzetti & Matt Apuzzo, Saudi Arabia, the CIA and the 
Arming of Syrian Rebels, IRISH TIMES (Jan. 24, 2016), http://www.irish
times.com/news/world/us/saudi-arabia-the-cia-and-the-arming-of-syrian-
rebels-1.2508641; U.N. Syria Chemical Weapons Probe Points to Sarin 
Exposure; Rebel Use Doubted, JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.japan
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harboring opposition rebels which launch cross-border military 
style attacks, if substantiated by evidence, should indicate that 
the SAR suffered an “armed attack” sufficient to trigger Russia’s 
right to exercise collective self-defense on behalf of the SAR. This 
conclusion seems inescapable in light of the fact that the United 
States invasion of Afghanistan, justified by the U.S.-led coalition 
as individual or collective self-defense, was deemed permissible 
under IHL without a prior UN Security Council authorization 
against an arguably non-state actor (the Taliban) on a novel 
theory of being an accomplice in a non-state actor’s (al-Qaeda) 
armed attack.108 
2. Chechen Rebels Who Have Conducted Terrorist Attacks 
Against Russia Are  Heavily Represented Among the 
Syrian Rebels, Potentially Justifying the Russian 
Intervention as Individual Self-Defense  
Russia has dealt with Chechen and Dagestani separatist 
movements and insurgencies since the Russian Empire 
conquered the Northern Caucasus region in the early 19th 
century, and within the last twenty-five years it has fought two 
wars to suppress armed Islamist insurrections in Chechnya and 
Dagestan. Islamist groups affiliated with these separatist 
movements have conducted multiple terrorist attacks against 
civilian targets within Russia, resulting in massive casualties.109 
 
times.co.jp/news/2016/01/05/world/u-n-syria-chemical-weapons-probe-points-
sarin-exposure-rebel-use-doubted/#.Vq2hkVLaQ5w (regime suspected of 
continuing to use chemical weapons). 
 108. See Ben Smith & Arabella Thorp, The Legal Basis for the Invasion of 
Afghanistan, House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/5340 (Feb. 26, 
2010), at 4–5. 
 109. See Greg Myre, Warlord Becoming Most Feared Man In Russia, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 15, 1999), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/
archive/?date=19990915&slug=2983256 (apartment bombings kill over 250); 
John B. Dunlop, The October 2002 Moscow Hostage-Taking Incident, RADIO 
FREE EUR. (Dec. 8, 2003), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342392.html 
(over 200 dead in theater hostage crisis); Volgograd Railway Station Blast, 
LIVE UPDATES, RT (Dec. 29, 2013), https://www.rt.com/news/volgograd-
suicide-bombing-updates-940/ (32 killed in suicide bombings); Chloe Arnold, 
Beslan Mothers’ Futile Quest for Relief, BBC NEWS (June 4, 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4608785.stm (over 320 dead in school hostage 
crisis); Richard Galpin, Russia Train crash ‘Caused by Bomb’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 
28, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8383960.stm (train bombing killed 
29); Moscow Bombing: Carnage at Russia’s Domodedovo Airport, BBC NEWS 
(Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12268662 (over 35 dead 
in train bombing); Two Blasts in Dagestan: 14 Dead, 87 Injured, RUSS. TODAY 
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Thousands of militants serving in anti-Assad rebel groups 
include peoples from the Caucasus who are Russian citizens, 
many of whom are also members of Islamist insurgent groups 
which have carried out terrorist attacks on Russian civilian and 
military targets.110 Shortly after the Russian intervention 
began, ISIL successfully downed a Russian commercial airliner 
flying over Egypt, killing 224 people—including dozens of 
Russian citizens—and demonstrating the continuing threat 
Russia faces from Islamist terror groups.111 The large presence 
of Chechen fighters in Syria within groups like ISIL has 
therefore heightened the Russian interest in the outcome of the 
Syrian conflict, and may justify the Russian intervention on 
individual self-defense grounds should Russia have been 
subjected to an “armed attack” by those groups.112 
As mentioned above, the UN Charter prohibits the use of 
force in the absence of a Security Council authorization or a 
justification under self-defense.113 To invoke individual or 
collective self-defense, the ICJ held in Nicaragua v. United 
States that a nation must have sustained an “armed attack,” and 
a recent international claims decision deemed minor border 
clashes between the conventional troops of two states to not 
qualify as armed attacks.114 In Nicaragua v. United States, the 
ICJ held that El Salvador had not been subjected to an “armed 
attack,” yet the court also stated that it lacked evidence of direct 
 
(May 3, 2012), https://www.rt.com/news/mahachkala-explosions-five-dead-547/; 
Russia Chechnya: Deadly Rebel Attack Rocks Grozny, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30323751 (dozens of Russian 
soldiers and policemen killed in gun battle with Chechen Emirate militants); 
Five Killed in Suicide Bombing in Chechen Capital, BBC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29498909. 
 110. See Lidia Kelley, Moscow Says About 2,400 Russians Fighting with 
Islamic State: RIA, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/09/18/us-mideast-crisis-russia-islamic-state-idUSKCN0RI0PG20150918. 
 111. Gianluca Mezzofiore, Isis Claims ‘Schweppes Can Bomb’ Blew Up 
Russian Metrojet Flight 9268 in Egypt’s Sinai - Dabiq, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 
18, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-claim-schweppes-can-bomb-blew-
russian-metrojet-flight-9268-egypts-sinai-dabiq-1529374 (explaining that IS 
claims responsibility for deadliest airliner attack in Russian history). 
 112. See supra Section I.A.1.; see also supra Section II.B.1. 
 113. See supra Section I.A.1.; see also supra Section II.B.1. 
 114. See generally Partial Award on the Jus Ad Bellum Eth.’s Claims 1–8 
(Eth. v. Eri.), 26 R.I.A.A. 457, 465 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n 2015) (“As the text 
of Article 51 of the Charter makes clear, the predicate for a valid claim of self-
defense under the Charter is that the party resorting to force has been subjected 
to an armed attack. Localized border encounters between small infantry units, 
even those involving the loss of life, do not constitute an armed attack for 
purposes of the Charter.”). 
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Nicaraguan involvement in the El Salvador’s Civil War.115 In 
either case, the issue of an “armed attack” related to the direct 
involvement of a state, whereas neither ISIL nor their Chechen 
Islamist allies receive any direct state support nor could either 
be called a state.116 Given these holdings it would seem unlikely 
that several major terrorist attacks against Russian civilians by 
stateless militant groups, supported openly by no other state, 
would fit the conventional definition of “armed attack.” Yet a 
comparison to the almost unquestioned legal basis of the United 
States invasion and occupation of Afghanistan raises questions 
about how closely related an irregular terrorist group must be to 
a state sponsor to make a terrorist attack an “armed attack” as 
defined by the ICJ.117 
The United States Ambassador to the UN legally justified 
the American invasion of Afghanistan prior to UN Security 
Council authorization by invoking the nation’s inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defense under Article 51, on the 
basis of al-Qaeda’s relationship to the Taliban regime, and the 
UN Security Council subsequently issued a resolution 
authorizing the continuing use of force in Afghanistan.118 In fact, 
the Taliban regime was engaged in a brutal civil war from the 
 
 115. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 230–32. 
 116. See Bill Roggio, Chechen Commander in Syria Pledges to Islamic 
Caucasus Emirate, LONG WAR J. (July 10, 2015), http://www.longwar
journal.org/archives/2015/07/chechen-commander-in-syria-pledges-to-islamic-
caucasus-emirates.php; Mairbek Vatchagaev, Caucasus Emirate Reverses 
Position on Syrian Jihad, THE JAMESTOWN FOUND. (June 28, 2013), 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41091&tx
_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=e52244ad41ac68df14f5f09a58799d97#.Vq2w-
1LaQ5y (describing the tension between Syrian and Chechen rebel groups). 
 117. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 190–191 (explaining that 
customary IL forbids organizing irregular groups for the purpose of incursions 
into another state’s territory and in supporting groups in another state’s 
internal conflict for the purpose of overthrowing that government). 
 118. Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., Letter Dated 7 October 2001 
from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the 
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2001/946 (Oct. 7 2001) (“From the territory of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda 
organization continues to train and support agents of terror who attack 
innocent people throughout the world and target United States nationals and 
interests in the United States and abroad. In response to these attacks, and in 
accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, 
United States armed forces have initiated actions designed to prevent and deter 
further attacks on the United States.”); see also S.C. Res. 1386, ¶ 3 (Dec. 20, 
2001) (“Authorizes the Member States participating in the International 
Security Assistance Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its 
mandate . . . .”); see also Smith & Thorp, supra note 108, at 4–5. 
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time of its formation and never exerted effective control over all 
of the territory of Afghanistan.119 The Taliban led regime was 
never internationally recognized as the legitimate government 
of Afghanistan as most nations continued to view the ousted 
Islamic State of Afghanistan and its Northern Alliance rebel 
coalition, which controlled a significant portion of Afghanistan 
up until the U.S. invasion, as the legitimate government.120 This 
begs a series of questions: if a nation must suffer an “armed 
attack” to justify individual self-defense, and if an “armed 
attack” can only be initiated by conventional or irregular forces 
directed by a “State,” then how could the Taliban launch an 
“armed attack” against the United States if they never exerted 
the effective control over Afghanistan necessary to constitute a 
“state?”121 If no “armed attack” occurred under this strict ICJ 
definition, then on what basis in IHL is the American 
intervention in and occupation of Afghanistan justified? If the 
international community is willing to accept the American 
intervention as permissible without addressing this void in legal 
justification, then the Russian intervention in Syria would 
presumably also be permissible, if directed explicitly against 
Chechen insurgent groups and their allies, such as ISIL, given 
state practice in the aforementioned Angola, Tajikistan, 
Afghanistan, and Mali interventions. 
3. Due to the Scope of Russian Operations the Russian 
Intervention Likely Cannot Be Justified as Anticipatory 
Self-Defense 
If, however, it cannot be said that the Chechen Islamist 
terrorist attacks on Russia rose to the level of “armed attacks,” 
Russia may have to turn to preemptive warfare as a justification 
 
 119. See Who are the Northern Alliance?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1652187.stm; see also sources cited infra 
note 132. 
 120. ADRIAN GUELKE, TERRORISM AND GLOBAL DISORDER: POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, at 55 (1st ed. 2006) (explaining that 
the Taliban achieved recognition only from the KSA, Pakistan, and the UAE); 
Afghanistan & the United Nations, UN, http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/
afghan/un-afghan-history.shtml (Islamic State of Afghanistan remained 
recognized until 2001 when Afghanistan transitioned to a new government); 
Zachary Laub, The Taliban in Afghanistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 4, 
2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551 (explaining 
that 10% of Afghanistan remained in Northern Alliance control at the time of 
the United States invasion). 
 121. See supra Section II.A. 
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for the intervention. Notably the terrorist attacks of Chechen 
and Dagestani Islamic insurgent groups differ from the 
Afghanistan model in that Chechnya and Dagestan are a part of 
Russia, and as such, the spread of these militants into opposition 
rebel groups in Syria could be characterized as the spread of non-
state parties to Russia’s internal armed conflict into Syria’s 
internal armed conflict, rather than an “armed attack” from a 
foreign terrorist group with a state sponsor.122 The Syrian 
government, as the result of sustaining heavy casualties and 
defections within the military, was unable to defeat these jihadi 
groups and was unable to make significant military progress 
until Iranian and Russian assistance increased.123 Given the 
helpless state of the SAR to suppress these powerful rebel 
groups, which include terrorist groups whose members have 
committed acts of mass murder against Russian citizens in 
Russia and abroad, the Russian intervention could potentially 
be justified as anticipatory self-defense.124 
Peremptory norms of IHL hold that a pre-emptive attack or 
defensive operation must meet the necessity and proportionality 
 
 122. See Commission on Human Rights Res. 2000/58, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2000/58 (Apr. 25, 2000) (explaining the Second Chechen War in 
terms of obligations under IHL, which by implication defined that war was an 
internal armed conflict); Valery Dzutsati, Experts: Russia’s Crackdown on 
Salafists at Home and Military Campaign in Syria Could Destabilize North 
Caucasus, JAMESTOWN FOUND. (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.jamestown.org/
single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45253&tx_ttnews[backPid]=228&cHash=758db67
5522151c461e01282ed6ff790#.VwBotXr4D7J; Valery Dzutsati, International 
Crisis Group: Russia Deliberately ‘Exported’ Jihadis to Middle East, 
JAMESTOWN FOUND. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.jamestown.org/regions/middle
east/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45230&tx_ttnews[backPid]=49&cHash=0c54c
ad59ae23fb26423b694f412bafc#.VwBpGHr4D7I (explaining reports alleging a 
Russian policy of encouraging Islamic militants to leave the Caucasus region 
and go to Syria). 
 123. See Jay Solomon & Sam Dagher, Russia, Iran Seen Coordinating on 
Defense of Assad Regime in Syria, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2015, 2:56 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-iran-seen-coordinating-on-defense-of-assad-
regime-in-syria-1442856556; Dr. Azeem Ibrahim, Russia Is Clearing the Decks 
for Assad, AL-ARABIYA NEWS (Jan. 3, 2016), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/
views/news/middle-east/2016/01/03/Russia-is-clearing-the-decks-for-
Assad.html. 
 124. See generally James Dever & John Dever, Making Waves: Refitting the 
Caroline Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 165, 
174 (2013) (discussing what constitutes a permissible use of force in an 
anticipation of an attack on a state); see also sources cited supra note 109 
(describing Chechen jihadi group attacks on Russian soil); Kelley, supra note 
110 (stating migrants from Middle East pose “great threat” to Russia); sources 
cited supra note 116 (explaining the involvement of Chechens in Syrian jihadi 
video addresses). 
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requirements.125 The necessity doctrine holds that a government 
seeking to employ anticipatory self-defense must demonstrate “a 
necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”126 The 
proportionality doctrine for anticipatory self-defense limits the 
range and gravity of military action available and obligated the 
soldiers conducting any such operations to do “nothing 
unreasonable or excessive, since the act, justified by the 
necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and 
kept clearly within it.”127 Assuming the presence of Chechen 
insurgents is a grave and imminent threat to Russian security 
and assuming that the necessity requirement is thereby met, the 
scope of the Russian military intervention will be restricted by 
proportionality to attacking only those groups which had 
prompted that “necessity of self-defence.”128 This would 
presumably limit available targets to the Chechen insurgent 
groups in Syria and their direct allies such as ISIL, yet Russian 
airstrikes have been conducted predominantly against Western 
backed rebels such as the Free Syrian Army until the more 
recent offensive against ISIL in Palmyra.129 Even recognizing 
that most groups fighting Assad in Syria are often closer to ISIL 
in ideology than they are to their secular Western patrons, 
opposition rebel groups aligned with the Free Syrian Army are 
generally enemies of hardline Islamist groups like Jabhat al-
Nusra unless military necessity dictates that they fight 
together.130 The Russian airstrikes have therefore likely 
 
 125. See ICRC, Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, CUSTOMARY IHL 
DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_
rule14 (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (“The principle of proportionality in attack is 
codified in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, and repeated in Article 57.”); 
Military Necessity, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/
casebook/doc/glossary/military-necessity-glossary.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 
2017) (“The principle of military necessity is, like the related principle of 
proportionality, an essential component of international humanitarian law. The 
‘principle of military necessity’ permits measures which are actually necessary 
to accomplish a legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by 
international humanitarian law. In the case of an armed conflict the only 
legitimate military purpose is to weaken the military capacity of the other 
parties to the conflict.”). 
 126. Dever & Dever, supra note 124. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See ‘More than 90%’ of Russian Airstrikes in Syria Have Not Targeted 
Isis, US Says, GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2015, 5:39 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/oct/07/russia-airstrikes-syria-not-targetting-isis. 
 130. See Hardline Islamists Among Syria’s Moderate Opposition, David 
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exceeded the scope of the necessity doctrine by attacking groups 
unrelated to Chechen insurgents or their Islamist allies in ISIL 
and Jabhat al-Nusra, making the intervention unjustifiable as 
anticipatory self-defense. 
C. STATE RESPONSIBILITY MAY INCULPATE THE RUSSIAN 
STATE AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY MAY INCULPATE 
RUSSIAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMMANDERS AS A 
RESULT OF THE SYRIAN INTERVENTION 
IHL jus in bello imposes stringent regulations on the 
methods Russian military forces, and any forces subordinate to 
Russian commanders, employ in their operations. IHL imposes 
obligations on combatants in an armed conflict to distinguish 
civilians from enemy combatants, to target only legitimate 
military objectives, and to prepare and execute attacks on such 
objectives so that any resulting civilian casualties and damage 
to civilian property is not disproportionate to the military 
advantage gained.131 Russian Defense Ministry Spokesmen 
Major General Igor Konashenkov has stated that “[o]ur aviation 
in Syria does not target populated localities,” yet there is ample 
evidence of Russian bombings of densely populated areas in 
rebel-controlled territory, which have resulted in hundreds of 
civilian casualties.132 There is also mounting but unconfirmed 
evidence of Russian generals directing SAA offensives, and of 
Russian combat troops directly participating in such 
 
Cameron Concedes, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.belfast
telegraph.co.uk/news/uk/hardline-islamists-among-syrias-moderate-
opposition-david-cameron-concedes-34358936.html; David Bromwich, Syria, 
the Times and the Mystery of the “Moderate Rebels”, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 
2, 2015, 9:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bromwich/syria-the-
times-and-myste_b_8236164.html (discussing speculations that Russia’s entry 
into the war will “push ‘Independent Islamists’ to ally themselves with al-
Nusra, and hence presumably will take them a degree closer to ISIS”). 
 131. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 250; see also sources cited supra note 34 
(explaining the cardinal principles of international humanitarian law including 
proportionality and distinction); Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, arts. 51, 
57. 
 132. Russian Defense Ministry Disproves Media Reports About Russian 
Airstrikes in Palmira, RUSS. NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 6, 2015, 5:47 PM), 
http://tass.ru/en/defense/826656 (statement by General Konashenkov); see also 
Martin Chulov & Kareem Shaheen, Russia’s Airstrikes on Syria Appear Futile 
with Little Progress on Ground, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2015, 8:46 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/21/russias-airstrikes-on-syria-
struggle-to-spur-progress-on-the-ground (at least 600 civilian deaths caused by 
Russian air strikes by this date). 
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offensives.133 If the scope of the Russian intervention is limited 
to airstrikes, with minimal or no command and control over SAA 
offensives and no direct Russian combat operations, then Russia 
need only concern itself with the rules of IHL pertaining to the 
permissible methods of conducting airstrikes within the 
aforementioned peremptory norms. On the other hand, if 
Russian control over the operations of the SAA and its allies 
rises to a level creating commander-subordinate relationships 
between Russian commanders and pro-Assad forces, then state 
responsibility and command responsibility will broaden the 
scope of criminal liability applicable to Russian military 
operations in Syria.134 Command responsibility will hold 
Russian military and civilian commanders criminally liable for 
knowingly failing to prevent, suppress, or punish war crimes and 
other violations of IHL or ICL committed by their subordinates 
in the Russian Military, the SAA, and other loyalist factions of 
the conflict.135 Since Russian military commanders act as agents 
of the Russian state, any such liability they incur under 
command responsibility will be attributed to the Russian State, 
making it liable under state responsibility.136 
1. State Responsibility: Pro-Assad Forces Have Committed 
Grave Violations of  IHL, but State Responsibility 
Only Potentially Inculpates Russia for the Operations of 
the Russian Air Force in the Absence of Direct Russian 
Involvement in Ground Offensives 
The Assad regime has committed many atrocities, which 
rise to the level of war crimes or crimes against humanity, in 
 
 133. See Thomas Gibbons-Neff, New Battlefield Video Shows How Russia’s 
Elite KSO Military Unit Is Fighting in Syria, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/12/13/new-
battlefield-video-shows-how-russias-elite-kso-military-unit-is-fighting-in-
syria/?utm_term=.7d0e48a4cd42; Siobhan O’Grady & Reid Standish, Russian 
Troops in Syria Will ‘Stay Until the End’, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 22, 2015, 4:22 
PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/22/russian-troops-in-syria-will-stay-
until-the-end/ (speculation that the SAA offensive in Latakia Province is being 
led by Russian generals); Ryan Rifai, Activists Geolocate Russian Soldiers on 
Ground in Syria, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 8, 2015, 5:47 PM), http://www.al
jazeera.com/news/2015/11/activists-geolocate-russian-soldiers-ground-syria-
151108135416902.html (speculation that Russian ground troops are directly 
participating in Syrian offensive operations). 
 134. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 391–96. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 29, arts. 1–2, 4–6, 8, 16. 
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flagrant violation of peremptory norms of IHL and the 1998 
Rome Statute.137 Forces aligned with President Assad 
infamously launched chemical weapons attacks on rebel held 
areas in Damascus, which various estimates have stated killed 
between 281 and 1,729 people.138 Among the other human rights 
and IHL violations committed by pro-Assad forces are looting, 
torture, rape, murder, ethnic cleansing, forced starvation of 
besieged populations in rebel-held cities, the use of 
indiscriminate weapons such as barrel bombs,139 and other grave 
violations of international law.140 Russian cooperation with the 
SAR government puts Russia in the undesirable position of 
having the acts of pro-Assad forces in the SAA and NDF 
attributed to it as a state under the doctrines of state 
responsibility and attribution. 
Article 1 of the International Law Commission’s Report on 
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(2001) declares state responsibility to mean that “[e]very 
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international 
 
 137. See Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 30th Sess., ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/30/48 (Aug. 13, 2015). 
 138. See Office of the Press Secretary, Government Assessment of the Syrian 
Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013, THE WHITE 
HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Aug. 30, 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-
assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21; S.B., If 
This Isn’t A Red Line, What Is?, ECONOMIST (Aug. 21, 2013, 9:48 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2013/08/syria-s-war; Syria - 
National Executive Summary of Declassified Intelligence, FRENCH EMBASSY IN 
PRETORIA (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.ambafrance-rsa.org/Syria-National-
executive-summary; Bodies Still Being Found After Alleged Syria Chemical 
Attack: Opposition, DAILY STAR: LEBANON (Aug. 22, 2013, 2:20 PM), 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Aug-22/228268-bodies-
still-being-found-after-alleged-syria-chemical-attack-
opposition.ashx#axzz2chzutFua. 
 139. See S.C. Res. 2139, ¶¶ 1, 3, 5, 11 (Feb. 22, 2014) (“Demands that all 
parties immediately cease all attacks against civilians, as well as the 
indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling 
and aerial bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs, and methods of 
warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering, and recalls in this regard the obligation to respect and ensure respect 
for international humanitarian law in all circumstances, and further recalls, in 
particular, the obligation to distinguish between civilian populations and 
combatants, and the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, and attacks 
against civilians and civilian objects as such.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 140. Id.; see also World Report 2015: Syria, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/syria. 
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responsibility of that State.”141 Internationally wrongful acts 
involve conduct consisting of an act or omission attributable to 
the state under international law and “[c]onstitutes a breach of 
an international obligation of the State” through its officials or 
state organs.142 Individuals other than state organs and officials 
can also have their conduct attributed to the state should they 
be “empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of 
the governmental authority . . . provided the person or entity is 
acting in that capacity in the particular instance.”143 The placing 
of state organs under the command of another state will not 
obviate attribution to the former state if such state organ “is 
acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority 
of the State at whose disposal it is placed.”144 The conduct of 
individuals will also be attributed to a state if they are “acting 
on the instructions of . . . that State in carrying out the conduct,” 
and a state knowingly assisting another state in the commission 
of an internationally wrongful act will also inculpate the former 
state.145 
As applied to the Russian intervention, these rules would 
attribute any breaches of international law committed by 
individuals, deemed de facto agents of the Russian State, to the 
state directly.146 While the Russian government claims that its 
assistance to the SAR is limited to airstrikes, training, and 
supplying arms, there are allegations that Russian commanders 
stationed in Western Syria are overseeing SAA offensives 
against opposition rebels.147 Some reports allege that Russian 
troops are directly participating in SAA ground offensives, 
although the existence of direct Russian participation in such 
offensives beyond the use of Special Forces units during the SAA 
re-conquest of Palmyra from ISIL remains unconfirmed.148 If 
Russian involvement in the intervention escalates beyond this 
 
 141. 2001 ILC Report, supra note 29, art. 1. 
 142. Id. arts. 2, 4. 
 143. Id. art 5. 
 144. Id. art. 6. 
 145. Id. arts. 8, 16. 
 146. Id. arts. 1–2, 4–6, 8, 16. 
 147. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (explaining the evidence for 
Russian command and control over pro-Assad forces). 
 148. See sources cited supra note 133 (explaining the evidence for Russian 
command and control over pro-Assad forces); see also sources cited supra note 
4 and accompanying text (explaining Russian aerial and ground operations in 
Syria); sources cited supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining Russian 
and Iranian assistance in the Syrian Civil War, the origins of the Syrian Civil 
War, and the various parties to the conflict). 
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stage of participation, however, Russian commanders and any 
Russian or pro-Assad forces placed under their command will be 
deemed organs of the Russian State. In the absence of such 
evidence confirming this level of involvement, it is unlikely that 
the actions of Syrian or Iranian forces will inculpate the Russian 
State directly.149 The Russian operations still retain the 
potential to blame the Russian State for any military action 
taken which violates IHL or knowingly assisting the pro-Assad 
forces in committing an internationally wrongful act.150 
2. Command Responsibility: Russian Commanders May Be 
Held Liable Under Indirect Command Responsibility for 
the Crimes of pro-Assad Forces if a Commander-
Subordinate Relationship Exists, but Evidence of Such a 
Relationship is Currently Lacking 
Russian military assistance to a government engaged in 
systemic atrocities could create individual command liability for 
Russian military commanders. Civilian and military 
commanders are criminally responsible under ICL for violations 
of IHL by their subordinates if they knew or had reason to know 
that their subordinates committed, or were going to commit, 
such crimes if they did not take all necessary and reasonable 
measures in their power to prevent their commission, or if such 
crimes had been committed and they did not take reasonable 
measures to punish the perpetrators.151 Command responsibility 
can be direct or indirect, with direct responsibility involving a 
direct order and indirect responsibility involving the negligence 
or recklessness of a civilian or military commander.152 Indirect 
command responsibility was illustrated in United States v. 
Yamashita, where a Japanese military commander was 
controversially convicted and sentenced to death for atrocities 
committed by Japanese troops on a respondeat superior (“let the 
 
 149. See generally Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (“The Court has 
taken the view that United States participation, even if preponderant or 
decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the 
contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning 
of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself, on the basis of the 
evidence in the possession of the Court, for the purpose of attributing to the 
United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of their military 
or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.”). 
 150. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 29, art. 16. 
 151. See GILL & FLECK, supra note 18, at 507. 
 152. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 391–96. 
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master answer”) theory of liability, even though he was unable 
to communicate with his subordinate troops during the period in 
which the crimes were perpetrated.153 From evidence of the 
circumstances surrounding the crimes, the tribunal reasoned 
that Yamashita was liable because he knew or should have 
known about the crimes committed by his army and omitted to 
establish the type of effective control over his troops that would 
have been required under the circumstances.154 
In the absence of compelling evidence of direct Russian 
command over pro-Assad forces, indirect command 
responsibility for joint operations of Russian and SAA, NDF, or 
Iranian troops is more immediately relevant to the Syrian Civil 
War. Customary IHL has generally endorsed an effective control 
test to determine whether a commander-subordinate 
relationship exists. The United Nations International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has held that a commander 
may consider a perpetrator his “subordinate” if he exercises a 
degree of control rising to “[e]ffective control . . . in the sense of 
having the material ability to prevent and punish the 
commission of [the] offences.”155 This test allows for indirect 
command responsibility for the actions of armed forces not 
officially subordinate to a commander, as it does not require a 
traditional military style commander-subordinate relationship 
for command responsibility to attach.156 
Determining whether a Russian commander exerts effective 
control, and thereby bears indirect command responsibility, over 
a member of pro-Assad forces is difficult given the decentralized 
command structure of those forces.157 The SAA has suffered 
heavy defections and casualties since the civil war began in 
 
 153. See GILL & FLECK, supra note 18, at 45; see also SOLIS, supra note 15, 
at 384; United States v. Tomoyuki Yamashita, U.S. Military Commission, 
Manila 8 Oct.-7 Dec. 1945; In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 16 (1946). 
 154. See sources cited supra note 153 (explaining command responsibility). 
 155. Prosecutor v. Dalalic et. al. (Celebici case), Case No. IT-96-21-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 256 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); 
see also Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-A, Judgment, ¶ 59 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 16, 2007). 
 156. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 403. 
 157. See SAMER N. ABBOUD, SYRIA 112 (2016) (“The local [loyalist] Syrian 
militias have played a pivotal role during the conflict. Although they operate 
with relative autonomy from the regime their participation in fighting rebel 
units has reduced the burden on the increasingly emasculated SAA. Indeed, 
four years after the conflict began, it is clear that the regime would not have 
survived and maintained control over large parts of the country without the 
active participation of militias.”). 
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2011. SAA has compensated for its manpower deficit by turning 
to paramilitary groups like the NDF, whose leaders some 
analysts believe have become provincial warlords who are 
autonomous from the Assad regime’s control.158 Furthermore, 
there are reports that commanders in the Iranian military 
forces, thousands of whom are currently fighting in Syria, are 
increasingly exercising operational control of major ground 
offensives involving the SAA, NDF, and other loyalist militias.159 
The fragmentation of command and control over pro-Assad 
forces will make it more difficult to determine which superior 
exercises effective control and command responsibility. Even 
minor direct participation by Russian ground troops can 
implicate indirect command responsibility if the facts and 
circumstances indicate Russian commanders exercise effective 
control over allied loyalist militias. 
A prominent example of indirect command responsibility 
over the actions of allied militias not formally subordinate to a 
military commander was shown in the Kahan Report, an Israeli 
government inquiry into the 1983 Sabra and Shatila Massacres 
in Lebanon. The Report explained how Israeli Defense Forces 
(“IDF”) surrounded a refugee camp and, issuing no order to 
 
 158. Id. at 112 (“The presence of militias throughout the country and the 
absence of rebel groups in those territories actually reflects the regime’s 
weakness, for its reliance on decentralized, privatized violence has dispersed 
decision-making power to centers potentially outside of the regime’s control. As 
the SAA contracts further the army is forced to engage in military attacks 
alongside local and regional militias. Such reliance on militias that are outside 
of the immediate command and control of the regime implies a withering and 
not a strengthening of the regime.”), 116 (explaining that it is estimated over 
40,000 soldiers in the Syrian Arab Army have died since the start of the 
conflict). But see Paul Bucala & Frederick W. Kagan, Iran’s Evolving Way of 
War: How the IRGC Fights in Syria, CRITICAL THREATS (Mar. 2016), 
http://www.irantracker.org/sites/default/files/imce-images/Irans_Evolving_
Way_of_War_IRGC_in_Syria_FINAL.pdf (“The National Defense Forces have 
been foot soldiers and sometimes cannon fodder, but have never been in charge 
of the fighting.”). 
 159. See Bucala & Kagan, supra note 158, at 2 (“The data shows, however, 
that Iranian officers are unlikely to have been commanding Iranian troops in 
Syria, as there have not been enough casualties reported among IRGC enlisted 
personnel to account for the number of officers killed based on normal casualty 
ratios. We hypothesize, therefore, that the IRGC has developed the ability to 
send a unit cadre to Syria, implant it among groups of militias, and successfully 
lead those militias in extremely hard fighting.”); see also id. at 12 (“But senior, 
active duty IRGC Ground Forces commanders have also been present in the 
fight since at least the summer of 2012 . . . These senior commanders were 
likely providing operational and strategic support to their Syrian counterparts 
in operation rooms far from the frontlines, as they were not dying in significant 
numbers during the early years of the conflict.”). 
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attack the camp, stood by as a contingent of allied Phalangist 
militants entered the refugee camp and massacred over 1,000 
Palestinian civilians.160 A government commission held that the 
IDF officers bore indirect command responsibility for the attack 
because they allowed the Phalangists to enter the camp and 
should have foreseen the danger of a massacre. In having such 
foresight, they omitted to adopt any appropriate measure to 
prevent the potential risk of crime from happening.161 The 
commission determined the IDF commanders knew about the 
planned operation and had a duty to inform their superior 
officers of the dangers involved in the operation, which they 
omitted to perform.162 The commission also found that the IDF 
officers who received the first reports of the massacre did not 
expedite actions to prevent the continuation of the criminal acts, 
thus failing to do everything in their power to prevent the 
massacres.163 
If a commander-subordinate relationship between Russian 
commanders and Syrian and Iranian ground forces can be shown 
by evidence, which it currently cannot, then Russian 
commanders would likely have foresight of the atrocities those 
forces intend to commit against regime opponents. In that case, 
Russian commanders could be liable under the Kahan Report 
standard.164 There are many difficulties associated with 
arresting and prosecuting war criminals shielded by states. As 
such, very few convictions have been sustained on a command 
responsibility theory.165 Sanctions based on command 
responsibility poses as a negligible deterrent towards Russian 
collaboration with the Assad regime and its allies. Alternative 
methods of deterring Russian collaboration with the Assad 
regime include imposing United Nations sanctions for Russian 
violations of IHL or ICL in Syria, but this may prove to be a futile 
proposition given Russia’s veto power on the United Nations 
 
 160. CHANTAL MELONI, COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 73 (2010). 
 161. See generally id.; see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO 
THE EVENTS AT THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN BEIRUT, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFF. (1983) [hereinafter KAHAN REPORT]. 
 162. See KAHAN REPORT, supra note 161 (explaining Israeli Defense Forces’ 
knowledge of the planned militia attack). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See generally id. (explaining the standard for indirect command 
responsibility). 
 165. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 404–05. 
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Security Council.166 If the law of armed conflict, jus ad bellum, 
permits Russian intervention in Syria, and if IHL provides no 
adequate deterrent to Russian military collaboration with 
individual war criminals, then a narrow linkage of those two 
fields of international law should be developed through state 
practice tying the initial lawfulness of a state’s decision to use 
military force to human rights and IHL considerations.167 
D. REVISITING THE NICARAGUA DECISION: PROPOSALS FOR 
INTEGRATING HUMAN  RIGHTS AND USE OF FORCE 
CONSIDERATIONS  
The separation of the law of armed conflict on the legality of 
a state’s use of military force from IHL, governing the lawfulness 
of an individual’s conduct while engaged in an armed conflict, 
currently allows for the provision of direct military assistance to 
rogue states like the SAR under a presumably lawful pretense 
of intervention by invitation or self-defense. A remedy to the 
undesirable incentive of supporting state and non-state actors 
engaged in war crimes and human rights violations may be 
developed in customary international law through consistent 
state practice prohibiting such assistance. The legality of any 
use of force in another state’s internal armed conflict, which is 
not authorized by the United Nations Security Council, 
including self-defense and intervention by invitation, should be 
regulated by a new peremptory norm illustrated in the proposed 
Draft Article below: 
  
 
 166. See Michelle Nichols, Russia Vetoes U.N. Demand for End to Bombing 
of Syria’s Aleppo, REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
mideast-crisis-syria-un-idUSKCN1280VJ?il=0. 
 167. Contra Dinstein, supra note 5, at 881 (“[O]ne of the most basic 
principles of modem international law is that of a total separation between the 
jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.”). 
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Draft Article: The Prohibition on Providing 
Military Assistance to Violators of International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law 
Any State which engages in the use of force in a non-
international armed conflict, not pursuant to an explicit 
authorization of the UN Security Council, is bound by the 
following provisions: 
(1) If an organ of a State, authorizing the use of force, 
is aware of a substantial likelihood under the 
circumstances that by such use of force: 
a. It would be providing military assistance 
to a State or non-State actor, which has 
committed or is committing serious 
violations of international humanitarian 
or human rights law, including grave 
breaches of international humanitarian 
law under the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and Protocol I, and 
b. The use of force is authorized, then; 
(2) Such use of force by that State will constitute an 
internationally wrongful act and a breach of 
international law which will be attributed to: 
a. The State which engaged in such use of 
force; and 
b. Any persons who are organs of that State 
responsible for authorizing such use of 
force. 
(3) Definitions. 
a. Use of Force. The term “use of force” 
includes the sending of any military forces 
of a state, including troops [as defined in 
(3)(c)], onto the territory of another state 
for purposes not limited to but including 
the provision of military assistance. 
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b. Military Assistance. The term “military 
assistance” in this article means 
assistance in the form of (i) providing 
airstrikes, (ii) providing military forces, 
and (iii) providing artillery 
bombardments or missile strikes. 
c. Military Forces. The term “military 
forces” includes all uniformed military 
troops, all volunteer and mercenary forces 
that are organs of that State, mechanized 
infantry, tanks, and any other armored 
vehicles. 
d. Substantial Likelihood. The term “aware 
of a substantial likelihood” [in (1)(a)] 
includes: 
i. Gross negligence in the awareness 
of, 
ii. Reckless indifference in the 
awareness of, or 
iii. Knowledge of, the existence of 
such violations [in (1)(a)]. 
e. “Organs” of a state include the definitions 
listed in the 2001 ILC Report. 
These proposed provisions would not offend past precedent 
in the law of armed conflict regarding the use of force, as they 
are consistent with the ICJ’s opinion in Nicaragua v. United 
States. The mere provision of arms alone does not constitute an 
“armed attack” which would violate the prohibition on the use of 
force in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.168 If the 
substance of this provision developed into a new peremptory 
norm of international law, it would link international law 
regulating decisions to go to war (jus ad bellum) with laws 
regulating the conduct of the participants in an armed conflict 
(jus in bello) by restraining invocations of self-defense or 
 
 168. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115. 
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intervention by invitation to prop up entities which violate IHL, 
international human rights law, and any of their applicable 
peremptory norms. 
In all non-international (internal) armed conflicts this Draft 
Article would create a new type of internationally wrongful act 
under state responsibility, authorizations of the use of force by 
state organs, which provide military assistance to state or non-
state actors who have been or are engaged in grave breaches or 
“serious” violations of IHL or international human rights law. 
Such acts, committed where there is knowledge of or reason to 
know of the existence of such violations, would attach individual 
criminal liability under ICL to the state organs involved in 
authorizing force and would attribute legal liability to the state. 
To trigger the provision the state organ authorizing such force 
must possess a mens rea of either knowing of, or being grossly 
negligent or recklessly indifferent in ascertaining knowledge of 
the existence of such violations, which would be determined by 
an international tribunal through drawing evidentiary 
inferences from case-by-case facts by the totality of the 
circumstances. The Russian state would thus be liable for the 
internationally wrongful act of its President (a state “organ”) as 
Russia’s close and longstanding alliance with Syria make it 
likely that President Putin, had knowledge of the now widely 
publicized IHL and human rights violations of the Assad regime 
at the time he authorized the Russian intervention in Syria. 
Such a norm is unlikely to succeed through state practice in the 
near future, as it would conflict with the geopolitical interests of 
many states, including the permanent five members of the UN 
Security Council, which have provided and continue to provide 
political, economic, or military support to various governments 
with appalling human rights records for a variety of reasons.169 
 
 169. See J. Sana Stuster, Mapped: The 7 Governments the U.S. Has 
Overthrown, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 20, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/
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III. CONCLUSION 
Russia’s military intervention in Syria is likely justifiable 
under the intervention by invitation exception to the non-use of 
force principle if limited in scope to the military targeting of 
terrorist groups such as ISIL, and may also be justifiable as a 
lawful exercise of collective or individual self-defense. Those self-
defense justifications, while bolstered by recent state practice, 
are likely weaker than the intervention by invitation exception, 
and anticipatory self-defense provides no adequate legal 
justification. State responsibility and attribution will hold the 
Russian State to be liable for violations of international law 
committed by state organs, and command responsibility could 
inculpate Russian civilian and military commanders for the 
actions of Russian troops and allied forces in Syria, but there is 
currently insufficient evidence to establish indirect command 
responsibility of SAA or NDF troops. The separation of 
international law jus ad bellum from IHL jus in bello has 
therefore enabled State governments such as Russia’s to back 
governments which commit systemic atrocities, and no clear 
peremptory norm currently forbids an otherwise lawful use of 
force solely on such jus in bello grounds. The principles of the 
draft article in the previous section would bring about a 
desirable focus on human rights in regulating decisions by states 
to enter into armed conflicts and would restrain the relative 
permissibility of the intervention by invitation exception, which 
may legally permit Russia to militarily back a mass-murdering 
dictator so long as the scope of the military assistance Russia 
provides is limited to a co-operative war against nebulously 
defined “terrorist” groups. 
